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THE  LAW  AND  ECONOMICS  OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Keith N. Hylton*
I. INTRODUCTION
No area of the law is perfect, and this truism certainly applies to prod-
ucts liability.  But products liability law has come in for some unusually harsh
criticism in the law and economics literature of late,1 and much of the treat-
ment of this area by economically-oriented legal scholars has been negative
for at least a generation.2
This Article offers a balanced economic assessment of products liability
law.  Any reliable assessment of the overall welfare impact of the system will
have to depend on empirical work.  Economic theory can do no more than
offer predictions about the incentives created by the law, hypotheses about
the law’s welfare effects, and identify the empirical questions that should be
addressed.
* William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor, Boston University, Professor of
Law, Boston University School of Law.  knhylton@bu.edu.  I thank Matt Saldana and Adam
Mayle for research assistance.  For helpful comments I thank Ward Farnsworth, Jim
Fleming, Mark Grady, and Ken Simons.
1 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1440 (2010) (engaging in a cost-benefit analysis of product liability
and concluding that the case for product liability law is weak for a wide range of products).
For a response to the Polinsky and Shavell article, see John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, The Easy Case for Products Liability Law: A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1919, 1921 (2010).
2 See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, In Defense of Caveat Emptor, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 64, 64,
66–67 (1970) (discussing the economic effects of the shift toward strict liability on manu-
facturers of products); George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History
of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461–65 (1985)
(chronicling the evolution of products liability law in the last century, citing specifically to
economics-based rationales).  For a somewhat less negative, though still largely negative,
assessment, see W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 6–13 (Harvard Univ. Press,
1991).  Viscusi focuses his criticism on design defect litigation, and proposes detailed
changes in the law. Id.  Similarly, Alan Schwartz is critical of design defect litigation. See
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability. Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353,
368 (1988) (arguing that design defect litigation is undesirable in that it assumes judges
and juries can assess consumer tradeoffs between risk and safety).
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This Article is largely a positive analysis of products liability law,3 in the
sense that it aims to predict the incentive effects and the welfare conse-
quences of the law, with close regard to its specific legal tests.  The other
major part of this Article is a normative assessment of the pieces of the law
that arguably should be reformed.  My overarching goal is to set up a frame-
work that can be used both to understand and to criticize the law.
In contrast to the law and economics literature suggesting that products
liability law is one big mistake, and perhaps should be abolished,4 I argue
that the law probably improves social welfare, though it is in need of reform
in several areas.  For judges and lawyers who have to work within the existing
framework, my hope is that a tailored set of reforms would be more useful
than the broad-brush critiques that have dominated the law and economics
literature on products liability.  On the other hand, a strictly positive eco-
nomic theory would also be less useful to courts because it would suggest that
everything could be just fine.  To the extent that there are puzzles about the
effects and the likely function of the law, a positive theory can provide
answers;5 but the law is so well entrenched, and so often critiqued, that a
normative component is clearly desirable in this case.
Products liability law operates largely on products that have observable
utility and hidden risks, relative to the safer alternatives available on the mar-
ket.  The observable-utility feature offers an advantage that attracts consum-
ers.  The hidden-risk feature leads to injuries.  This combination of features
is unlikely to be regulated well by the market.  The market is likely to fail, for
these products, in providing incentives for optimal consumption or for pro-
ducers to make welfare-enhancing design changes.  In contrast, for products
with open and obvious risks, the market is likely to regulate optimally, in the
sense that where alternative designs exist that offer equivalent utility and less
risk, the market will effectively exclude the riskier products.
The law has the potential to correct the market’s failures.  Moreover, the
scope of the market that is regulated by products liability law is so vast that
the work of courts cannot be supplanted by government regulatory agencies,
even if it were possible to avoid problems such as agency capture and languid
public-sector incentives.  Even in the absence of capture or dull incentives,
courts applying liability rules to producers have an advantage over govern-
ment regulators because they respond to real injuries rather than breaches of
regulatory orders, which may or may not generate serious injuries.
However, there are some glaring inefficiencies in the products liability
system.  The cost of litigation is passed on, at least in part, to the consumer,
3 For an early positive economic analysis of products liability law, see William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD. 535, 535 (1985).  Given the substantial changes in the law since 1985, the arguments
of the Landes-Posner study need to be reconsidered, perhaps rejected in some instances
and updated in others.  That is what this Article does.
4 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1492. R
5 Landes & Posner, supra note 3, at 536.  But positive theory may seem Pollyanna-ish R
to courts given current controversies in products liability law.
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in the form of an implicit liability premium substantially greater than the
amount required to fund a compensation scheme for injured consumers.
Effectively, consumers must pay a tax on products that supports a compara-
tively inefficient and administratively cumbersome litigation industry.6  In
addition, products liability law fails to send the right signals for precaution
and for product search on the part of product buyers, a group that includes
businesses as well as ordinary consumers.
The law can be reformed so that it comes closer to its potential by
addressing problems observed in several pockets of products liability doc-
trine.  The reforms I propose require no legislative intervention; they are
capable of being implemented by courts.  I consider this an ideal feature of
any list of reforms because legislative intervention runs the risk of political
stalemate and interest-group meddling.  The subjects I suggest for reform
are: (1) the feasible safe alternative requirement, (2) legal doctrine gov-
erning ambiguous risk-utility tradeoffs (or what I refer to below as “risk-risk”
tradeoffs), (3) insurance market inefficiencies (adverse selection and moral
hazard), (4) preemption, (5) bright line rules versus vague standards, and
(6) controlling incentives for fraud in mass torts.  This is by no means an
exhaustive list of all of the potential areas of reform in products liability law.
But it does address some of the key sources of uncertainty and excessive cost
in the system.
My analysis of incentives and welfare effects proceeds in several stages.
First, I employ the supply and demand curve framework, familiar from ele-
mentary economics courses, to examine the effects of strict producer liability
in markets with informed consumers and in markets with uninformed con-
sumers.7  I analyze consumption effects and design incentive effects in an
ideal setting in which there are no litigation costs or insurance market ineffi-
ciencies.  In this ideal setting, strict producer liability leads to socially prefera-
ble consumption and design decisions (i.e., enhancing society’s welfare), in
comparison to a rule of no liability, when consumers are not informed about
product risks.8  I then move away from the ideal setting by incorporating
litigation costs, uncertainty over the application of the liability rule, and
insurance-market inefficiencies, all of which point to the conclusion that the
6 While markets are under constant pressure to reduce costs and increase quality, this
is not so for courts, which do not face competition.
7 See generally A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (4th
ed. 2011) (introducing fundamental concepts of economics and applying those concepts
to products liability examples to evaluate alternative liability rules); Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–6 (1980) (discussing the efficiency benefits
within a strict liability model despite uninformed consumers or misperception).
8 When consumers are informed as to product risks, liability cannot improve upon
the market outcome. See Buchanan, supra note 2, at 67 (arguing that imposition of strict R
liability harms consumers who knowingly purchase risky products, because it “closes off
mutually advantageous exchanges” between these consumers and firms willing to sell risky
products at cheap prices); see also POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 114–16 (providing a simply R
illustration of the result that where consumers are risk neutral and perfectly informed, the
choice of a liability rule is irrelevant).
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welfare effects of strict producer liability are ambiguous.  In Part III of the
argument, I apply the analysis to the actual legal tests generated in the prod-
ucts liability case law, the risk-utility and consumer expectations tests.  I
examine how the actual tests perform under ideal market conditions and
under real-world conditions.
In the ideal setting, the consumer expectations test is socially preferable
to the risk-utility test.  This is because the risk-utility test generates socially
excessive consumption when incremental risk is less than incremental utility
(i.e., positive net utility designs), and the two tests perform equivalently with
respect to design incentives.9  In the real-world analysis, which allows for liti-
gation costs and insurance-market inefficiencies, it is no longer clear that the
consumer expectations test is preferable to the risk-utility test.  With complex
products, unobservable risk is always present, which implies that the con-
sumer expectations test forces the manufacturer to provide a costly and inef-
ficient form of insurance to the consumer.  In contrast, the risk-utility test has
the feature that it spreads the payoffs between positive net and negative net
utility designs.  In a world of expensive litigation and uncertainty, this feature
probably makes the risk-utility test preferable to the consumer expectations
test, in terms of its effects on consumption and design incentives.
I focus on product design litigation because that is the most controver-
sial area of products liability.10  The other two major areas of products liabil-
ity litigation, manufacturing defect and failure to warn lawsuits, have
generated relatively clear law and raise fewer difficulties in analyzing incen-
tive effects.  I argue, in Part IV, that the simple strict liability rule that applies
in manufacturing defect cases—i.e., defects that result from glitches in the
manufacturing process—is defensible in light of the information and expec-
tations consumers are likely to have.  In a market in which the vast majority of
products are not dangerous due to manufacturing glitches, a paradox of
safety will hold: consumers will not search for defects due to glitches for the
same reason that they do not search for zebras in Central Park; they are
unlikely to find any.  In light of this safety paradox, strict liability enables the
market to distinguish (and ultimately usher out of circulation) products gen-
erated from low-quality manufacturing processes.  Failure to warn litigation is
less controversial and defensible for a different reason: it is simply a species
of negligence litigation, which courts have managed for hundreds of years.11
Part II provides a brief history of the law and the evolution of policy in
the courts.  Part III sets out the economics of products liability law; first ana-
9 See Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Products Liability 4 (Boston Univ. Sch.
of Law, Working Paper No. 12-39, 2012), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/
scholarship/workingpapers/hyltonrev.html.
10 See Aaron D. Twerski & James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers’ Liability for Defective
Product Designs: The Triumph of Risk Utility, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (2009).
11 I realize that the history of negligence doctrine is itself a controversial topic, and
one that is beyond the scope of this paper.  Holmes argued that the fault principle had
been part of the common law from the earliest reported decisions. See OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 85–90 (Dover Publications 1991).
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lyzing the effects of a simple strict liability rule, and then looking at the
effects of the actual legal tests.  I examine the law’s effects on consumption
and design choice incentives.  Part IV discusses manufacturing defect and
failure to warn litigation.  Part V summarizes the implications of the positive
analysis and examines reform proposals.
II. BACKGROUND ON LAW AND POLICY
So much has been written on the development of products liability doc-
trine that there is little need for an extended discussion here.12  Instead of
tracing the development of the law, I will focus on the policies reflected in it
and its implications for the incentives of sellers and manufacturers.
There is general agreement that the first important innovation in prod-
ucts liability law was the abandonment of the privity doctrine of Winterbottom
v. Wright.13  Under the privity rule, a consumer injured by a negligently con-
structed product could maintain a negligence action only against the imme-
diate seller, i.e., the party with whom he was in privity of contract.14  The
privity requirement was effectively abandoned in Cardozo’s celebrated deci-
sion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.15
Although MacPherson is commonly viewed as a dramatic break from the
preexisting law on products liability, it can also be seen as a thoroughly pre-
dictable evolutionary outcome of the common law process.  The privity doc-
trine, like every other common law rule, had generated substantial
exceptions over its life.  Judge Sanborn provided a summary of the excep-
tions in Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co.16:
The first is that an act of negligence . . . which is imminently dangerous
to . . . life or health . . . and which is committed in the preparation or sale of
an article intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life, is actionable by
third parties . . . .17
The second exception [applies to] an owner’s act of negligence which
causes injury to one . . . invited by him to use his defective appliance upon
the owner’s premises . . . .18
The third exception . . . is that one who sells or delivers an article which he
knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb . . . without notice of its
qualities is liable to any person who suffers an injury therefrom . . . .19
12 See, e.g., Priest, supra note 2, at 461–65 (chronicling the evolution of products liabil- R
ity law); Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 796–802 (1983) (chronicling the evolution of liability doctrine).
13 Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 at 403.
14 Id.
15 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916).
16 120 F. 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1903).
17 Id.
18 Id. at 870–71.
19 Id. at 871.
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These three exceptions, especially the first and third, are capable of such
broad interpretations that it is important to ask how they were limited and
under what conditions the exceptions failed to apply.  The first exception was
understood during the privity era to apply to things like poisons, explosives,
and drugs.20  In Thomas v. Winchester,21 a consumer was allowed to recover
from a seller who falsely labeled a poison and sold the falsely labeled poison
to a drugstore.22 Thomas fits neatly into the first exception and indicates that
during the privity era courts interpreted the words “preserve, destroy, or
affect human life”23 in the narrowest sense.  Items that were understood to
have this property were drugs or instruments designed to preserve life, and
firearms designed to destroy life.
The third exception applied when the seller knowingly passed on a
defective product without giving notice of its qualities, and the product was
dangerous to life or limb.  Thus, a seller who did not know of the latent
defect could not be held liable under the third exception; and a seller who
passed on a product whose defects were immediately obvious would also
avoid its reach.
MacPherson scrapped the privity rule by interpreting the first exception
expansively; it would no longer be applied only to drugs and explosives, it
would also apply to cars and other items that could be dangerous to life or
limb if negligently constructed.24 MacPherson involved a four party transac-
tion rather than the familiar three party (manufacturer, retailer, customer)
transactions of the privity cases.25  The defendant, Buick, had acquired a
defective car wheel from a supplier.26  Buick installed the wheel and sold the
car to a dealer, who then sold it to MacPherson.27  MacPherson was injured
when the wheel crumbled, and sued Buick.28
By applying the first exception to the privity rule in MacPherson, the
court implied that the manufacturer of a product has a general duty to
20 See Bishop v. Weber, 1 N.E. 154 (Mass. 1885) (holding caterer liable for furnishing
unwholesome food to guests, explicitly rejecting a theory of implied contract in favor of
negligence theory); Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870) (allowing
plaintiff to recover damages resulting from defendant corporation that sold naptha—an
explosive liquid—to a lamp fluid retailer); Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143 (1870)
(allowing plaintiff to recover damages resulting from defendant selling laudanum, a
poison, as rhubarb, a medicine, to an intermediary); Dixon v. Bell, (1816) 105 Eng. Rep.
1023 (allowing a third party to recover for damages due to the act of leaving a loaded gun
with a young girl who shot the third party). Dixon did not involve a transaction, but it has
been treated as within the set of cases leading to the first exception to the privity rule. See,
e.g., Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 507–519
(1948) (chronicling early privity rule case law).
21 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
22 Id. at 410.
23 Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 870 (8th Cir. 1903).
24 See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1055 (N.Y. 1916).
25 Id. at 1051.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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inspect for latent defects in components purchased from other manufactur-
ers.29  The manufacturer’s failure to do so would not lead to liability on a
theory of fraud, as possibly implied by the third exception, but under a the-
ory of negligence based on his failure to conduct a reasonable inspection of
the product.
While MacPherson stands as the most important landmark in the history
of products liability doctrine, there are two others.  One is Judge Traynor’s
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno.30  The other is
the adoption of the strict products liability doctrine by the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts in 1965, which was followed by widespread acceptance in the
case law.31
Judge Traynor’s opinion in Escola presents several theories supporting
strict liability for injuries caused by defective products.32  The most influen-
tial theories set out by Traynor I will label as the deterrence rationale, the
reliance rationale, the insurance rationale, and the administrative costs
rationale.
The deterrence rationale holds that strict products liability provides an
incentive for the party best able to control product accidents to take steps to
minimize their occurrence.  The modern law and economics literature has
introduced a more sophisticated version of this rationale, one that empha-
sizes the role strict products liability plays in controlling excessive consump-
tion of risky products.33  Under strict liability, the price of the risky product
would reflect its level of risk, so that consumers would shift their purchases
from risky products toward comparatively safe products.34  I will examine the
consumption effect in more detail later in this paper.
Outside of the consumption effect, the case on deterrence grounds for
choosing strict products liability over negligence requires a much more sub-
tle argument than that offered by Traynor.  Traynor argued that strict prod-
ucts liability would encourage manufacturers and sellers to take more care in
the preparation and sale of products; but that is not clear if one looks closely
at incentives.  One of the basic lessons of the law and economics literature is
that the precautionary incentives provided by negligence and by strict liabil-
29 Id. at 1055.
30 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring).
31 Since then, a substantial majority of jurisdictions have adopted the basic position
which it espouses. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 657–658 (4th ed.
1971).
32 Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–44.
33 See POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 114–15; Shavell, supra note 7, at 4. R
34 See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 43–44 (2006); STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 213 (2004); Stephen F. Williams,
Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 932, 932 (1993);
see also Buchanan, supra note 2, at 66 (arguing strict liability will increase the cost of prod- R
ucts overall, but the cost of risky products more dramatically, effectively pricing risky prod-
ucts out of the market).
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ity are, to a first approximation, equivalent.35  In other words, if one is decid-
ing how much care to take in some activity, such as driving, the level of care
that would be privately optimal would be the same whether the law imposes
strict liability or negligence.  Of course, this proposition is based on a simple
model of incentives that ignores the likelihood of judicial error and the
impact of litigation costs.  Still, if one imagines the initial thought processes
of someone who actually considers the potential liability costs under a negli-
gence rule or under strict liability, the conclusion that the incentive effects
are the same is probably valid as a description of first impressions.  Someone
who thinks superficially about the incentive implications would probably start
with the assumption that courts are accurate and that litigation costs would
not prevent a tort victim from filing a claim.36
Given the likelihood that strict liability and negligence would have
equivalent effects on precautionary incentives, the case for choosing strict
liability instead of negligence, as a method of controlling the incentive to
take care, would have to point to the capacity of strict liability to regulate care
along margins that are unlikely to be affected by the negligence rule.  One
plausible argument, unaddressed by Traynor, is that strict liability regulates
the incentive to take care along margins that are unobservable to plaintiffs.
Indeed, for negligence to actually control care-taking incentives, the vic-
tims of negligence must be able to identify the negligent acts that would jus-
tify a lawsuit.  However, if victims cannot identify the negligent acts or
omissions, they will not be able to formulate negligence theories based on
those occurrences, and negligence law will not serve effectively as a regulator
of precautionary incentives.37  In this event, strict liability has an advantage
over negligence and can generate superior precautionary incentives.
While cases of unobservable negligence in preparation and sale may
have been common at the time of Traynor’s opinion, they are probably much
less so today.  Plaintiffs often hire experts who are familiar with the manufac-
turing and marketing of products, and can generate all of the relevant theo-
ries of negligence.38  But being able to generate a theory of negligence is not
the same as being able to prove it.  Plaintiffs are probably capable of generat-
35 See SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 213–14. R
36 For a potential tortfeasor who thinks beyond the superficial level, litigation costs
and error probabilities will affect their incentives. See Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation and
Legal Error under Negligence, 6 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 433, 433 (1990).
37 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is designed to enable the plaintiff to recover in
many of these settings, but the plaintiff’s claim has to satisfy the conditions required by the
doctrine: (a) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of
someone’s negligence, (b) it must be caused by an agency within the exclusive control of
the defendant, and (c) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution
of the plaintiff. See PROSSER, supra note 31 at 214.  If the plaintiff’s claim does not satisfy R
the conditions of res ipsa doctrine, the inability of the plaintiff to articulate a precise the-
ory of negligence will be fatal to his claim.
38 See William A. Donaher et al., The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation,
52 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1310–11 (1974) (discussing the different areas in which experts may
be helpful, including conjunctively to prove the individual evidentiary elements of proof).
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ing a complete list of relevant negligence theories in today’s litigation envi-
ronment, but defendants may benefit from an informational advantage.39  In
sum, while the notion of unobservable negligence is far less likely to be a
serious issue today than it was in Traynor’s time, it has not completely disap-
peared as a factor influencing litigation outcomes.
The reliance rationale holds that strict products liability is an improve-
ment over negligence because consumers in the era of mass production have
relied on the assurances of manufacturers.40  Product sellers attempt to cre-
ate brands in order to form loyalty bonds with consumers.41  Consumers are
led by these loyalty-creation efforts to assume that the products sold through
established channels will be safe for consumption.  The reliance theory
implies that this expectation of safety may be applied across the board to all
products.  Consumers with limited capacities to distinguish products and
recall the specific promises of individual sellers are likely to treat all products
as if they carry, to some degree, a guarantee of reliability and safety.42
The reliance rationale should be viewed as a part of the deterrence ratio-
nale rather than, as in Traynor’s view, a separate theory.  The deterrence
rationale relies on the assumptions that manufacturers will take too little care
in the absence of liability, and that consumers will be unable to accurately
assess the degree of risk presented by a specific product in the market.  Both
of these assumptions are necessary under the deterrence rationale because if
consumers could correctly assess the level of risk, there would be no problem
of excessive consumption.43  In addition, the precaution that manufacturers
are observed taking would be the appropriate level for the risk preferences of
their consumers.44
The insurance rationale holds that strict products liability is desirable
because it spreads the risks of injuries caused by defective products.  Under
this theory, consumers who purchase Coca-Cola are better off under strict
liability because they will be compensated in the event that a Coke bottle
39 Obviously, the defendant has access to better information on his own compliance
with the legal standard.  The discovery process can reduce the defendant’s informational
advantage, but it is unlikely to eliminate it. See Bruce L. Hay, Civil Discovery: Its Effects and
Optimal Scope, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 481, 482 (1994) (arguing that the threat of an adverse
inference influences a defendant’s decision whether to withhold or disclose evidence).
40 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1994) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); Robert Dorfman, The Economics of Products Liability: A Reaction to McKean, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 92, 99–100 (1970) (highlighting the trust that must be placed on manufac-
turers given the lack of branding inherent in the era of mass production).
41 Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring).
42 In other words, if consumers have limited capacities for information storage, they
will find it difficult to distinguish products that have a guarantee of safety from branded
products that do not.  If the vast majority of branded products come with a guarantee of
safety, consumers may rationally act as if all of them do.  A related point has been made by
Judge Posner for recognizing the dilution theory of trademark protection. See Ty Inc. v.
Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002).
43 See Buchanan, supra note 2, at 68. R
44 See id.  See also Dorfman, supra note 40, at 98. R
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explodes in their hands.  The law forces them, in a sense, to purchase an
insurance policy along with the product.  The theory obviously has limits; in
real insurance markets, consumers make voluntary choices to buy coverage,
and often have the option to limit their coverage to the particular risks they
are likely to face.  Under the strict liability regime, however, consumers have
no such choice, and this has important implications for the validity of the
insurance theory.
The administrative costs rationale holds that strict products liability gets
courts to the same endpoint that they would reach under the negligence
rule, but does so in a cheaper fashion.  Instead of jumping through the
hoops of asserting negligence and relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, consumers could sue on the basis of strict liability and forgo the extra
costs of attempting to prove negligence.
Whether strict products liability would provide an administrative cost
savings is an empirical question, which remains largely unaddressed today.45
Traynor assumed that there would be a savings of administrative costs
because of the greater ease of pleading and of proving strict products liabil-
ity.  But this argument ignores the inevitable development of defenses under
strict products liability and the greater volume of litigation that would result
if strict liability actually did reduce the cost of prosecuting a lawsuit.
This is not an exhaustive list of the arguments marshaled by Traynor in
favor of strict liability.46  However, the insurance, deterrence, and administra-
tive cost theories are the most general a priori policy grounds offered for
strict products liability, and for that reason probably the most persuasive to
lawyers, judges, and academics who take an instrumental view of the law.
The Traynor opinion had its largest immediate impact in the arena of
ideas rather than in the case law.  The American Law Institute was moved at
least in part because of Traynor’s arguments to adopt strict products liability
in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in 1965.47  However, before
the publication of section 402A there were, in fact, very few cases, if any, that
clearly relied on Traynor’s theory in order to hold a product seller liable.
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.48 is sometimes cited as the first case
45 SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 282–83. R
46 See, e.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 441–42 (Traynor, J., concurring) (explaining that
responsibility should be fixed on the party who can most effectively reduce hazards in
defective products).
47 See Fleming James, Jr., A Tribute to the Imaginative Creativity of Roger Traynor, 2 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 445, 445–46 (1974) (explaining that Traynor’s views in Escola were adopted in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963), which in turn, was embod-
ied in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965)); Richard W. Wright, The Principles
of Product Liability, 26 REV. LITIG. 1067, 1068 (2007) (describing Traynor’s concurrence as
being “ratified and adopted” in Greenman, which in turn was a “catalyst” for section 402A,
“based on the same rationales” as Greenman); cf. Priest, supra note 2, at 498-99, 505, 513-17 R
(arguing Traynor’s concurrence “set[ ] forth the grounds” for the strict products liability
standard adopted in, among other jurisdictions, California (in Greenman), a result William
Prosser used to advocate for the adoption of section 402A).
48 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
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applying the strict products liability theory, but this theory appears in Green-
man (in an opinion for the court written by Traynor) only as a basis for
upholding a lower court decision that was itself based on negligence and
warranty theories.49  The same can be said of the other major case often
cited, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instruments Corp.,50 where the plaintiff, a plane
crash victim, brought a negligence claim against American Airlines, and
breach of implied warranty claims against the airplane manufacturer (Lock-
heed) and an instrument supplier (Kollsman).51  By a four-to-three vote the
appellate court upheld the judgment against Lockheed, citing Greenman’s
theory of strict liability.52  Again, this falls far short of supporting the claim
that courts had begun to adopt Traynor’s theory.
There are two views on the adoption of strict products liability in section
402A.  One, advanced provocatively by George Priest, is that the American
Law Institute was bamboozled, so to speak, into adopting strict products lia-
bility theory by the persuasive effort of William Prosser.53  According to this
view, Prosser led the American Law Institute to believe that there was a domi-
nant trend of cases adopting the strict products liability theory, when in fact
there was not.54  After the American Law Institute accepted the theory,
courts were then led to believe such a trend existed, and cited the Restate-
ment for support as they rushed to adopt the theory.55
The alternative view, which Priest does not consider in his critique, is
that the American Law Institute was merely getting ahead of the curve, and
adopting a doctrine that would soon be accepted by courts generally.  Under
this view the American Law Institute appears as a facilitator of legal evolu-
tion, as a body that can play the role of speeding without affecting the direc-
tion of doctrinal change, sometimes by creating apparently discontinuous
jumps in the path of legal doctrine.56  While under the Priest view, the Amer-
ican Law Institute appears as an entity that produces private legislation to the
detriment of the common law process and the common law, the alternative
view would treat the ALI as a facilitator of the transition between common
law regimes without substantially altering the content of the law.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to try to say which of these views is
correct.  But I am inclined to believe the alternative view in this case.  The
products liability regime ushered in by the Restatement and the courts does
have a consistent theoretical core, which I hope to expose below.  This is a
characteristic that one does not find in private legislation, or in legislation
49 Id. at 899.
50 191 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 1963).
51 Id. at 81–82.
52 Id. at 83.
53 See Priest, supra note 2, at 511–19. R
54 Id. at 512-15.
55 Id. at 518-19.
56 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 641-45 (2001) (describing the evolu-
tion of the common law as happening “sporadically” due to a number of factors such as
higher court opinions, new legislation or introduction of a novel issue).
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generally.  Moreover, the ALI has more to lose than anyone else in attempt-
ing to enact private legislation disconnected from the real case law.  Courts
are decentralized, and do not have to hand down decisions that comply with
the ALI’s Restatement project.57  Presumably they would stop reading the
ALI if it pushed its luck too far in attempting to shape the common law.
Section 402A provides the first effort at a general statement of products
liability law.  Although the Second Restatement provides only one theory of
liability,58 the consumer expectations test, the law would soon develop into a
rich set of doctrines revolving around three theories.59  One type of products
liability claim is brought in the case of a manufacturing defect, which is a glitch
that occurs in the course of making a product.60  The typical manufacturing
defect case involves a product that deviates from the manufacturer’s design
and from other units of the same product made by the manufacturer.61
Thus, consider a manufacturer of widgets; one widget in every 1,000 deviates
from the norm, and is defective in a way that is potentially harmful to the
consumer.  A consumer who is injured by such a widget can bring a claim on
a theory of absolute liability against the manufacturer or seller.  The plaintiff
is not required to prove fault, or unreasonableness of any sort.62  If the plain-
tiff can present enough evidence to support the inference that his injury is
due to the defective widget, and that the product defect was there when the
product left the seller’s hands, he has won his case.  Thus, the plaintiff is
required only to produce evidence that the defect exists, and that excludes
57 See Herbert W. Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713, 716-17 (1970) (explaining that some states refused to
follow section 402A’s strict products liability standard, and predicting a future conflict
between section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code). See, e.g., Sensenbrenner v.
Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 57–58 n.4 (Va. 1988) (“Virginia law
has not adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and does not permit tort
recovery on a strict-liability theory in products-liability cases.”), superseded by statute on other
grounds, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-223 (2011); Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d
968, 978 (Del. 1980) (holding the Uniform Commercial Code’s sales provisions preempt
strict products liability, as described in section 402A, in cases involving the sale of goods);
Swartz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 378 N.E.2d 61, 62 (Mass. 1978) (“[T]here is no ‘strict liability
in tort’ apart from liability for breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
58 This is contestable. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Con-
sensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 879–80 (1998). Henderson and
Twerski note that the author of section 402A, William Prosser, contended that negligence
principles were to determine the application of products liability law, in spite of the con-
sumer expectations language used in section 402A. Id.
59 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 344–45 (2d ed. 2008)ILL (listing the
“three types of defect” in products liability as manufacturing defects, design defects, and
warning defects); Sheila L. Birnbaum & Barbara Wrubel, “State of the Art” and Strict Products
Liability, 21 TORT & INS. L.J. 30, 30 (1985) (“Traditionally, three categories of product
defect have been recognized as providing a basis for the imposition of liability upon manu-
facturers and sellers: defect in manufacture, defect in design, and defect by reason of the
absence or inadequacy of a warning.”).
60 OWEN, supra note 59 at 869–70 n.6. R
61 Id.
62 Id.
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the possibility that the defect is due to his own mishandling or the conduct of
some third party.63
A second theory of strict products liability governs the case of a design
defect.  The design defect claim asserts that the manufacturer’s design is itself
unreasonably dangerous.64  There are two tests courts have applied: the con-
sumer expectations test and the risk-utility test.  Under the consumer expecta-
tions test, the plaintiff is required to show that the product failed to conform
to the safety expectations of the average consumer.65  Under the risk-utility
test, the plaintiff is required to show that the product is unreasonably danger-
ous in the sense that the incremental risk associated with the defendant’s
chosen design far exceeds the incremental utility when compared to an alter-
native safer design.66
One source of potential variation in the law is whether prevailing on the
consumer expectations test is sufficient for the defendant, or whether the
defendant must prevail on both tests in order to win his case.  Some impor-
tant jurisdictions, most notably California in Barker v. Lull Engineering Com-
pany, Inc.,67 have held that the defendant must prevail on both tests.68  Some
others have suggested that the defendant prevails if his product satisfies the
consumer expectations test.69  Under the consumer expectation test, the
defendant will prevail if the defect in question is deemed “open and obvious”
by the court.70  Thus, the survivors of a state trooper felled by bullets that hit
areas unprotected by his bulletproof vest lost their design defect claim
against the vest maker because the risk of such an event was obvious.71
Although the law governing design defect cases has been set out with
varying legal formulations in each state, the case law suggests a general adop-
tion of the risk-utility approach.72  As Henderson and Twerski note, the con-
sumer expectations test has been limited as a theory for the plaintiff in
California by later decisions.73  On the defendant’s side, many of the cases in
which courts have rejected plaintiffs’ design claims on the ground that the
defect was open and obvious involve risky features that are also central to the
function of the product—such as the open arm vents of a bulletproof vest.74
Where the risky characteristic is central to the function of the product, then
63 See id. at 874.
64 See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 10, at 1076. R
65 Id. at 1076–77.
66 See, e.g., id. at 1080 n.95.
67 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978).
68 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 58, 898–901. R
69 Id. at 899–901.
70 Linegar v. Armour of Am., 909 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 1990).
71 See id.
72 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 58, at 887; Twerski & Henderson, supra note R
10, at 1062. R
73 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 58, at 898–900. R
74 See, e.g., Linegar, 909 F.2d at 1154 (concerning arm vents of bulletproof vest); Halli-
day v. Sturn, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Md. 2002) (dealing with a gun without a
safety lock).
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it is highly likely that a court would hold that the design is lawful under the
risk-utility test.75
The third theory in the modern products liability case law is failure to
warn.  These cases have been examined under the negligence theory: the
defendant is guilty of negligence for failing to warn where the burden of
providing a warning is less than the foreseeable harms to the consumer.76
Special doctrines have developed in the products liability setting, such as the
presumption that the consumer will heed the warning if it is given.77  These
special doctrines reflect efforts by courts to design rules that facilitate the
provision of information to courts rather than radical departures from basic
negligence law.
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In this Section, I present an economic analysis of strict products liability.
The actual legal tests in operation—the consumer expectations test and the
risk-utility test—are a bit more complicated than the simple strict products
liability rule that I examine initially in this Section.  The purpose for examin-
ing a simple strict liability framework is to establish some propositions that I
will use in analyzing incentives under the actual legal tests.
A. Economics of the Product Market
Because I will rely on the familiar supply and demand curve framework,
it is helpful to start with an introduction to basic terms.  Figure 1 shows the
supply and demand curve for a product, say cars.  Cars come in many differ-
ent styles and, in light of this, the demand and supply curves in Figure 1 are
shown only for one variety, the “Safe Model.”  The Safe Model serves as the
benchmark for risk-utility analysis in products-liability law.
The horizontal axis in Figure 1 measures the number of Safe-Model cars
on the market, the vertical axis is measured in dollars-per-car.  The demand
curve reflects at each point the maximum price the consumer is willing to
pay (willingness-to-pay) for a car—which is his evaluation of the utility, mea-
sured in dollars, that he derives from the item.  Because of “declining margi-
nal utility” (the tendency for the first unit of consumption to contribute
more to utility than the second and subsequent units) consumers will pay less
for additional units of the item, and so the single consumer’s demand curve
slopes down.  The market demand curve in Figure 1 sums up the amount
desired by each consumer at each price level.  Thus at any given price the
75 See, e.g., Bolduc v. Colt’s Mfg. Co., 968 F. Supp. 16, 18 (D. Mass. 1997) (“Second, the
alternative design advocated by the plaintiff . . . would have substantially interfered with
the gun’s functionality.”); Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370, 379–80 (D. Mass. 1996)
(holding that a pistol that accidentally discharged was not defectively designed because a
safer alternative would have altered its functional purpose of “getting off a shot quickly”).
76 M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W.
VA. L. REV. 221, 223 (1986).
77 See id. at 234.
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market demand curve reflects (in aggregate) the consumption decision of
the marginal consumer—the one who is almost indifferent between purchas-
ing the good and going without it at the stated price.  The market supply
curve, on the other hand, reflects the costs of producing the item, and thus
the upward slope reflects the assumption that supply costs increase as more
of the item is provided to the market.  The market equilibrium, where the
price of the safe model is p˜safe and the quantity purchased on the market is
q˜safe, is observed where the price the marginal consumer is willing to pay is
just equal to the cost of supplying an additional safe model.
p
q
Ssafe
Dsafe
q˜safe
p˜safe
FIGURE 1
At levels of output below the market equilibrium, the marginal utility of
an additional unit, as measured by the demand schedule, exceeds the margi-
nal cost, as measured by the supply schedule.  As the quantity increases from
zero, this positive gap between marginal utility and marginal cost continues,
though declining in size, until we reach the equilibrium level, where the net
benefit to society from an additional unit of output is exhausted.  Producing
beyond the equilibrium quantity reduces social welfare because the marginal
utility is less than the marginal cost of the additional unit of output.  Thus,
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the market equilibrium is the socially optimal level of consumption—because the
market’s contribution to social welfare, as measured by the difference
between aggregate consumption utility and production costs, is at its maxi-
mum level.
B. Strict Products Liability Effects
In this Part I will apply the market framework just described to a simple
model of strict products liability.  The model assumes that the manufacturer
is strictly liable for product-caused harms.  The strict liability rule is similar to,
though simpler than, the consumer expectations test adopted in section
402A of the Restatement (Second).  The model also assumes that there are no
administrative and litigation costs associated with the liability system.  I will
establish a few basic propositions about the effects of strict liability in the
product market, and later extend the analysis by introducing litigation costs
and by considering the actual legal tests for liability.
The manufacturer has a choice between two car designs.  One is Safe
Model.  The other, Risk Model, is more appealing to consumers but imposes
higher expected accident costs.  To be more concrete, suppose Safe Model is
a plainly designed, relatively safe car.  Risk Model has a more appealing
design but contains a dangerous feature.  For example, Risk Model could be
the 1963 Corvair, which although appealing to the eye had a hidden dan-
ger.78  The front end of the shaft extending to the steering wheel of the
Corvair was located in front of the axis for the front wheels.79  In a head-on
collision from the left, the shaft of the steering wheel would push in toward
the front seat, impaling the driver.80
1. Strict Liability and Regulation of Consumption
a. Uninformed Consumers
As a default position, I assume that the amount a consumer is willing to
pay for a product is based on observable factors that he or she likes.  Thus,
consumers are willing to pay more for Risk Model than for Safe Model
because they can observe only the appealing features of the risky product.
The safe product is comparatively boring.  Figure 2 translates these assump-
tions into the supply and demand framework.  The demand curve is higher
for Risk Model than for the Safe Model, reflecting the incremental utility (U),
measured in dollars, a consumer would perceive in acquiring that model.
As for the supply side, I assume that the costs of production and market-
ing are the same for the risky and safe products.  Ordinarily, this would imply
that the supply schedules for the risky and safe products would also be the
same.  However, for expositional purposes I will introduce a notional supply
curve for the risky product (Srisk in Figure 2), which reflects the additional
78 See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 505–06 (8th Cir. 1968).
79 Id. at 497.
80 Id. at 496–97.
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injury costs generated by the risky product—i.e., the incremental risk R.  There
is nothing in this framework that requires injury costs to be treated as supply
costs; under appropriate conditions they could be treated as part of the disu-
tility of consumption.  But to do so would imply consumers can observe the
product’s risk, which I assume not to be true in the default scenario.
The loss due to injury caused by the dangerous features of the risky
product is a real cost associated with the supply and consumption of the
product.  Given this, the cost of injury should be reflected in a market analy-
sis.  Since this cost is not perceived by consumers when they enter the mar-
ket, I treat it here as a cost of supply.  Thus, the notional supply curve for the
risky product reflects all of the costs borne by society, and therefore is the
supply schedule that one should use to find the socially optimal level of con-
sumption in the setting where consumers are uninformed as to risk.81
We come now to a fundamental result.  In the absence of producer lia-
bility, if consumers are not aware of the injury risks associated with the Risk
Model (e.g., the Corvair), then they will consume a socially excessive quantity
of the risky product; society’s welfare could be enhanced by cutting back on
consumption.82
To see why consumption of the risky product is excessive in the absence
of producer liability, consider the market’s operation when consumers are
fully aware of the incremental utility of the risky product, but unaware of the
incremental risk.  Consumers may be attracted to the Risk Model by its
design, or because of its speed, both visible attributes.  The risk of injury (for
example, impalement by the steering wheel shaft)83 is not visible.  Given
these assumptions, consumers will not take into account the disutility of
injury; they will consider only the additional utility associated with the Risk
Model.  In addition, since producers are not liable for injuries caused by
their products to consumers, the supply schedule for the Risk Model will not
include the injury costs; it will be the same as the supply schedule for the Safe
Model.  The market equilibrium will occur where the price the marginal con-
sumer is willing to pay for the risky model is just equal to the cost of supply-
ing the safe product—that is, in Figure 2, at the intersection of the Risk
Model demand curve and the Safe Model supply curve (point A).  However,
the socially optimal level of consumption of the risky product will occur when
the price the marginal consumer is willing to pay for the risky product is just
equal to the social cost of supplying the risky product—that is, where the Risk
Model demand curve intersects the Risk Model supply curve (point B).84
81 This is a fairly conventional approach in the economic analysis of products liability.
See, e.g., POLINSKY, supra note 7, at 113–14. R
82 SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 213–15; Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribu- R
tion and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 503 (1961).
83 See supra note 78–80 and accompanying text. R
84 At point B in Figure 2, the price and output levels are p˜risk and q˜risk, where p˜risk > p˜safe
and q˜risk < q˜safe.
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FIGURE 2: R > U
Strict producer liability improves welfare in this scenario.  Under strict
liability, the expected injury costs are shifted to the manufacturer, and thus
the supply schedule for the risky product reflects the fact that the risky prod-
uct generates greater costs, due to injury, at each level of output than does
the safe product.  The Risk Model’s price rises, under strict liability, and con-
sumers purchase fewer Risk Models.85  The market equilibrium under strict
liability occurs where the price the marginal consumer is willing to pay for
the risky product is just equal to the social cost of supplying an additional
risky model (point B).  Given that the marginal utility of the consumer is
equal to the marginal social cost of supply, the market equilibrium quantity
under strict liability is the socially optimal level of consumption—that is, the
consumption level at which the wealth generated by the Risk Model market,
85 But note that the price increase shown in Figure 2, moving from point A to point B,
is smaller than the incremental risk R.  This reflects the assumption, in the diagram,
regarding supply and demand elasticities.  If supply is infinitely elastic (i.e., the supply
curve is a horizontal line), the price increase will be equal to the incremental risk.
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measured in terms of the net benefits to consumers and producers, reaches
its highest feasible level.
b. Informed Consumers
A second proposition from this framework is that if consumers are fully
aware of the product’s risk and utility characteristics, then strict products lia-
bility can serve no socially beneficial purpose in altering consumption levels.
Suppose the consumer knows of the incremental utility of the Risk Model,
and also knows to subtract off the disutility due to the expected cost of injury.
Suppose, for example, the consumer values the additional utility at $1000,
but also knows, say from examining insurance prices, that the disutility due to
accident risk is $2000.  Because the consumer is aware of the additional risk-
based cost, he will deduct that cost from the maximum price he is willing to
pay for the product.  In terms of the supply-demand analysis, this implies that
the incremental utility of the risky model will cause its demand to shift up (in
comparison to the safe version), and, at the same time, the incremental risk
will cause the demand for the risky model to shift down.  The two shifts,
shown in Figure 3, yield a new equilibrium price and quantity (point C),
where the price is lower than under strict liability (point B) and the con-
sumption level is the same as under strict liability.  The new equilibrium price
is lower than under strict liability because the consumer is no longer purchas-
ing from the manufacturer mandatory insurance to cover the risk of being
injured by the product.  The consumer self-insures, in effect, by accepting a
reduction in the price equal to the value of the insurance premium on a
policy that would compensate in the event that he is injured by the product.
I have so far considered the case in which the consumer is unaware of
the product’s risk and the law imposes strict liability, and the case in which
the consumer is fully aware of the product’s risk and the law does not impose
strict liability.  The remaining case to consider is where the law imposes strict
liability and the consumer knows the product’s risk characteristics.
Assume the strict liability rule applies, and suppose consumers are fully
aware that they will be compensated if they are injured by a dangerous fea-
ture of the product and also aware of the specific risk characteristics of the
products they purchase.  For example, the consumer may not know about the
risk characteristics of the product initially, but discovers that the product is
risky and that there will be compensation (say, because he reads about prod-
ucts liability lawsuits against the manufacturer).86  If the compensation pay-
ment makes these fully-informed consumers indifferent as between the injury
and no-injury events,87 the equilibrium quantity will be socially optimal.
Why?  Presumably consumers would know that they will be compensated only
86 Polinsky and Shavell discuss ways in which consumers might become aware of prod-
uct risks. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1445–48. R
87 That is a big assumption.  For serious injuries, most consumers would prefer to
avoid the injury than to suffer it and receive compensation. See Dorfman, supra note 40, at R
101–02.
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FIGURE 3: R > U
to the extent they are injured, so that the expected compensation offsets the
expected injury.  Realizing this, the consumer’s demand curve would shift
down by the amount of the expected injury loss and shift up by the amount
of the expected compensation.  Since the two amounts are equal, the con-
sumer’s demand schedule would reflect only the product benefits but not the
risk—and this causes no distortion because the risk charge is already incorpo-
rated into the supply schedule.  The compensation requirement operates
only as mandatory insurance, funded by adding a surcharge to the price of
the product.
If consumers are only partially compensated for their injuries, and they
are not fully informed about the risks of the product, strict liability would
push the supply curve up toward the notional supply curve (Srisk), but not all
the way.  The product’s price would rise, but not enough to fund an insur-
ance policy that provides full compensation for injury to the consumer.  The
final result—i.e., the degree to which consumption of the risky product is
excessive—would depend on whether the consumer is fully informed as to
the product’s risk characteristics.  If the consumer is fully informed, both as
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 21  9-AUG-13 10:57
2013] the  law  and  economics  of  products  liability 2477
to the product’s risk characteristics and the lack of full compensation, the
market will (again) generate the socially optimal level of consumption.88  If,
on the other hand, the consumer completely discounts the risk of harm
because of lack of information, then it follows that the consumption level
generated by the market will exceed the socially optimal level—though the
degree of over-consumption will be lower than in the case in which the pro-
ducer is not strictly liable.
2. Strict Liability and Regulation of Design Choice
Another dimension of product safety regulation concerns the choice of
design.  A manufacturer may have a choice between producing the Risk
Model and the Safe Model.  Does strict liability encourage the manufacturer
to make the optimal design choice?  To examine this question, I will start
with the ideal setting in which there are no administrative or legal costs, and
courts are accurate.
a. Choice between Existing Designs
Presumably the manufacturer will choose the design that provides the
greatest profit.  In this framework, for any given quantity of the product
demanded, the price of the Risk Model is just the sum of the price of the Safe
Model and the incremental utility provided by the Risk Model, i.e., pricerisk =
pricesafe + U.  Given the assumption that production and marketing costs are
the same for the risky and safe products, in the absence of producer liability,
the profit that a firm can earn by selling any given quantity of the risky prod-
uct is greater than the profit it would earn from selling the same quantity of
the safe product.89  For example, if the price of the safe version is $1 and the
incremental utility of the risky version is $1, the firm will earn an additional
$1 by selling one Risk Model rather than one Safe Model.
The profit per unit from selling the safe product is just the difference
between the price of the safe product and its unit cost, i.e.; unit profitsafe =
pricesafe – unit cost.  The profit per unit from selling the risky model, in the
absence of liability, is the difference between the price of the risky product
and its unit cost: unit profitrisk = pricerisk – unit cost.  If the consumer is unin-
formed as to product risk characteristics, the producer generally will prefer
to sell the risky model because the profit per unit is higher for the risky
model than for the safe model; specifically, unit profitrisk – unit profitsafe = U.
88 The reason is that the demand curve will shift down by an extent that reflects the
consumer’s expected uncompensated loss.  This downward shift will offset the fact that the
supply curve fails to reflect all of the product-related costs.  The amount consumed will
remain the same as under full compensation.
89 Specifically, the profit of the firm selling the Risk Model, in the absence of liability is
prisk(q)q – c(q) = psafe(q)q – c(q) + Uq. Thus, as long as U > 0, the firm can do at least as well, in
the absence of products liability, by producing the risky product as it can by producing the
safe product.
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Under strict products liability, the risk cost is internalized to the pro-
ducer, so that the unit profit of selling the risky model is reduced by the
expected liability.  Given this, the unit profit of the risky model seller is equal
to the price less the sum of the unit cost and the unit liability; that is, unit
profitrisk = pricerisk – unit cost – R.  The per unit profit differential between the
risky and safe model, under strict products liability, is the difference between
incremental utility and incremental risk; that is, unit profitrisk – unit profitsafe = U
– R.
Thus, under strict liability, the producer will choose the risky design if the incre-
mental utility is greater than the incremental risk.  It follows that strict products liabil-
ity optimally regulates design choice.90
The foregoing analysis of design incentives applies to the case in which
the consumer is unaware of the product risks. If consumers are aware of the
product risks, then the producer will never have an incentive to choose a design for
which the incremental risk exceeds the incremental utility, when there is a safer feasible
alternative.  If consumers are aware of the risk, then the maximum possible
price increase the producer can charge for the risky model is just the differ-
ence between incremental utility and incremental risk, U – R.  Given this, the
producer will sell a risky model only when the incremental risk is less than
the incremental utility.
The argument here assumes, as in the earlier presentation, that there
are no administrative costs, that courts are perfectly accurate, and that there
are no externalities that would distort the private incentives away from social
incentives.
b. Innovation
This analysis so far assumes that the producer chooses between two
designs—the safe design or the risky design—without considering where
these models come from.  In the real world, someone has to innovate by
creating the new risky design.  Innovation is often costly.
First, assume, as in the previous examinations, that consumers are not
fully informed as to product risk characteristics.  The producer has a choice
to produce the relatively safe product, or to innovate to produce the rela-
tively risky product.  How does strict liability affect incentives to innovate?
Since, under strict liability, the producer will profit more from selling the
relatively safe product when incremental risk exceeds incremental utility,
strict liability will discourage innovation in the form of designs for which
incremental risk exceeds incremental utility.  This follows directly from the
argument that strict liability optimally regulates design choice.  If strict liabil-
ity induces producers to make optimal choices between existing designs, it
90 The profit of the firm selling the Risk Model, under strict liability, can be written as
prisk(q)q – c(q) – Rq  = psafe(q)q – c(q) + (U – R)q. Thus, as long as U > R, the firm can do at
least as well by producing the risky product as it can by producing the safe product.  Simi-
larly, if U< R, the firm can do at least as well producing the safe product as it could by
producing the risky product.
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follows a fortiori, given that innovation is costly, that it discourages innova-
tion of “net-negative utility products,” i.e., products for which the incremen-
tal risk exceeds the incremental utility.
Consider net-positive utility products—that is, where incremental utility
exceeds incremental risk.  Strict liability encourages the choice of such a
design if it already exists as an option to the safe design.  However, if a firm
spends resources in innovation to produce a new design, for which incremen-
tal utility exceeds incremental risk, the firm creates surplus for consumers
that is not captured entirely in the product’s price.91  However, strict liability
internalizes the injury risks introduced by the new product.  The end result is
that some of the benefits of innovation are externalized to consumers as a
group, in the form of additional consumer surplus, while the new risk costs
are fully internalized to the producer by liability.  This implies that innova-
tion incentives are not optimal under strict liability.
Of course, the innovation incentives generated by strict liability are no
different from the case in which consumers are fully informed.  If consumers
are fully informed, the risk costs of the new product will be internalized to
producers, in the form of lower bids for their products, while the consumer
surplus from innovation is externalized.92  It also follows from the foregoing
that if consumers are fully informed, no firm will invest resources in innovation to
bring forth a new design for which the incremental risk exceeds incremental utility.
C. Some Real-World Complications
I have so far focused on the short-run implications of strict products
liability under ideal conditions in which administrative and litigation costs
are zero and courts make accurate decisions.  I will expand the analysis in this
Part to consider long-run implications and some real-world complications
such as litigation costs and judicial error.
91 However, if the firm can engage in perfect price discrimination by charging each
consumer a price equal to the maximum the consumer is willing to pay, it will be able to
capture all of the surplus that would have otherwise gone to consumers.  In this special
case, the incentive to innovate will be socially optimal—because the firm will be able to
compare its innovation costs with the total social payoff from innovation.  As long as the
firm cannot engage in perfect price discrimination, it will not be able to capture all of the
surplus going to consumers.  To the extent that the innovating firm cannot capture all of
the consumers’ surplus, it externalizes part of the social payoff from innovation (to con-
sumers).  For a discussion of the economics of innovation, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 390-94 (1988).
92 Again, this statement assumes that the innovating firm cannot engage in perfect
price discrimination.  If the firm can engage in perfect price discrimination, then its incen-
tive to innovate will be socially optimal in a market in which consumers have full informa-
tion as to product risk and utility features.
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1. Consumption Effects
a. Long Run Versus Short Run
Strict liability, in a setting where consumers are uninformed as to prod-
uct risks, is similar in effect to a tax on the manufacturer’s product, where
the tax is equal to the per-product insurance premium on a policy covering
physical and property injury caused by the product.  The preceding analysis
showed that the market equilibrium changes, as a result of strict liability, to
one in which the product price is higher and the quantity sold on the market
lower.  However, the price increase is not as large as the per-product injury
cost (see Figure 2).93  In other words, the manufacturer’s price rises, but not
by the full extent of the “risk cost,” which is equal to the insurance premium.
This implies that in the short run, the costs of strict products liability are not
passed on fully to the consumer; they are shared between the producer and
the consumer.94
But this is only the short-run effect of strict products liability. The output
reduction effect of strict liability is larger in the long run than in the short run; and in
the long run, the costs of strict products liability are passed on fully to the consumer.95
Why?  Suppose the market was competitive before the imposition of strict
liability, so that producers were just covering their costs initially.  Since the
price fails to rise by the full amount of the expected per-product injury loss
after the imposition of strict liability, producers of the risky model cannot
earn a competitive return as a group.  Thus, some producers of the risky
model will exit the market rather than continue to suffer economic losses,
and, as this occurs, total output falls further.96  Producers will continue to
exit the market until the price the remaining producers receive is sufficient
to allow them to return to the competitive “normal profit” position (i.e., just
covering opportunity costs of production and supply) that existed before the
imposition of strict liability.  That will require a smaller output than associ-
ated with the short-run equilibrium level, and a higher price.  The long-run
price level will be equal to the sum of the pre-liability unit cost of production
and the per-product insurance premium.
b. Litigation Costs and Legal Error
As an insurance mechanism, strict products liability is inefficient in com-
parison to standard private insurance.  In order to collect compensation, a
claimant must go to court and argue his case before a judge, a procedure
that surely would not be adopted internally within any insurance firm that
93 See supra Figure 2.
94 In general, the extent to which the costs are passed on the short run is a function of
demand and supply elasticities.  For an extensive examination of passing costs and legal
rules, see generally Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distri-
bution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991).
95 Buchanan, supra note 2,at 66-68. R
96 In terms of the supply and demand framework shown in Figure 2, the supply curve
for the Risk Model will shift upward.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 25  9-AUG-13 10:57
2013] the  law  and  economics  of  products  liability 2481
hoped to survive in a competitive market.  The cost imposed on the pro-
ducer, therefore, is considerably greater than that of a per-product insurance
premium, because it includes not only the cost of compensation but also the
cost of a policy that pays for the producer’s legal defense team.  The per-
product liability premium will also have to cover, in addition to legal
expenses, the cost of potential nonpecuniary and punitive damages awards.
Although punitive damages are rarely awarded, nonpecuniary awards are
quite common and typically increase the total damage award by one-hundred
percent (that is, nonpecuniary awards are roughly equal to the objective por-
tion of damages).97  Even if the producer were willing to concede liability, he
might still need to employ a legal defense team in order to contest the plain-
tiff’s damages claim.
Taking litigation costs (including possible nonpecuniary and punitive
damage awards) into account leads to the conclusion that the output reduc-
tion effect of strict products liability is considerably larger than suggested in
the previous discussion,98 even in the short run.  It would not be unrealistic,
for example, to assume that litigation costs increase the total per-product
insurance premium by as much as thirty percent on average.99  A study of the
DPT vaccine, which vaccinates against diphtheria, pertussis (whooping
cough), and tetanus, found that, in 1987, ninety-six percent of the vaccine’s
cost could be explained by the products liability cost premium.100
97 See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and-
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1789 (1995) (noting that compensa-
tion for pain and suffering is widely targeted for tort reform).
98 See supra Part III.C.a.
99 See JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, R-3391-ICJ, COSTS
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION vii (1986) (showing defense costs are as much
as thirty to fifty percent of compensation awards).  If these results are reliable as averages,
the compensation awards can be used to predict defense costs.
100 See Richard L. Manning, Changing Rules in Tort Law and the Market for Childhood Vac-
cines, 37 J.L. & ECON. 247, 273 (1994).  Manning notes that the vaccine, which was devel-
oped prior to the widespread adoption of products liability law, increased in price by
6000% from 1970 to 1987, though the vaccine remained relatively unchanged from its
original form. Id. at 248.  For an analysis of how products liability law in the United States
has affected the prices of popular prescription drugs relative to the prices of those same
drugs sold in Canada (which employs a negligence standard, rather than strict liability, and
in general has a less plaintiff-friendly environment in this area), see generally Richard L.
Manning, Products Liability and Prescription Drug Prices in Canada and the United States, 40 J.L.
& ECON. 203 (1997).  Manning argues that removing liability risk from the costs of 121 of
the 200 most commonly prescribed drugs in the United States, sold by the same manufac-
turer and under the same brand name in Canada, would reduce the overall mean price
differential between the U.S. drugs and their cheaper Canadian counterparts by roughly
half, from 69.7% to 35.5% (while the median price differential would drop from 43.6% to
32.6%). Id. at 204-08.  Manning takes into account the comment k exception and still
finds a large difference in U.S. and Canadian litigation costs. See id. at 206–08; see also infra
note 102 and accompanying text. R
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Of course, if consumers are risk averse, the mandatory insurance
imposed by products liability could possibly enhance their welfare.101  But
the costs of litigation probably exceed the amount that any rational con-
sumer would pay in the market for the insurance coverage mandated
through products liability.
Legal error introduces another component in the producer’s cost esti-
mate.  Strict liability does not apply to all instances of personal or property
injury caused by a product; it does not apply to injuries that are classified as
economic losses, and there are exemptions (such as the Second Restatement’s
comment k exception) covering certain products.102  If courts are biased
toward finding a product covered by the class to which the strict liability rule
applies, legal error of this type would imply that the effective scope of strict
liability is somewhat unpredictable.103  This also implies that the overall out-
put reduction effect could exceed the level suggested in the previous
discussion.
Litigation costs have an impact on the consumer as well.  Some injured
consumers will forgo their right to sue because the cost of litigation exceeds
the value of their claim for compensation.  This offsets the litigation cost
burden on producers, because some claims will go uncompensated.104  But
101 If consumers are risk averse, they would be willing to pay more than the actuarially
fair premium for insurance against loss.  The mere fact that the liability premium is greater
than the actuarially fair insurance price does not imply that consumers are worse off, if
they are risk averse. See Jennifer H. Arlen, Liability for Physical Injury When Injurers as Well as
Victims Suffer Losses, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 411, 413-17 (1992) (providing an economic model
for optimal levels of care and risk-spreading in pairs of risk-averse individuals); David
Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV.
L. REV. 831, 854-57 (2002) (proposing optimal “tort insurance” for risk-averse individuals).
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).  Comment k refers to
“some products” generally, but to drugs specifically (such as the rabies vaccine), that “in
the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended and ordinary use.” Id.  Strict liability does not attach where such products are
“properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given.” Id.  In modern litigation,
comment k is understood to apply to defective design claims. See, e.g., West v. Searle & Co.,
806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991) (“[B]y its terms comment k exempts unavoidably unsafe
products from strict liability only where the plaintiff alleges a design defect, but it does not
offer protection from allegations of manufacturing flaws or inadequate warnings.”); Brown
v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (holding that comment k applies to all
“defectively designed” drugs).
103 The scope of comment k is a perfect example of legal uncertainty under products
liability law.  Many states follow California’s rule—adopted in Brown, 751 P.2d at 481-83—
that applies the comment k exemption to all prescription drugs. See James M. Beck, Com-
ment K, Some of the Way, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW (April 28, 2011, 6:18 PM), http://drugand-
devicelaw.blogspot.com/2011/04/comment-k-some-of-way.html.  Beck has catalogued
twenty-four jurisdictions, including several borderline cases, that have applied the com-
ment k exception to all prescription medical products. Id.  In non-Brown states, the scope
of the comment k exception is difficult to predict. Id.
104 On the implications of litigation costs in a regime of strict liability, see generally
Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under
Negligence, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1990).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 27  9-AUG-13 10:57
2013] the  law  and  economics  of  products  liability 2483
most cases involving product defects involve designs that can and inevitably
will generate large damage claims, considerably greater than the cost to the
victim of bringing a claim to court.  The class action device allows attorneys
to bundle and bring to court cases involving numerous small claims.  Given
this, the litigation cost burden is likely to increase the cost burden on pro-
ducers, even after taking into account the rate at which claims are dropped
or not pursued because of the litigation costs on the plaintiff’s side.
c. Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Correlated Claims
Since strict products liability operates as a coercive insurance mecha-
nism we should not be surprised to find problems familiar in the insurance
context appearing in this setting as well.  Three important ones are adverse
selection, moral hazard, and something I will refer to as the “cascading
claims problem.”
i. Adverse Selection
Adverse selection occurs when the risk characteristics of potential insur-
ance customers vary in a manner that is unobservable to the insurer.105  In
this setting the insurer will offer a price for a given policy that is at least as
large as the average cost for that policy.  Since the terms are unlikely to be
attractive to low-risk customers—that is, customers who are unlikely to suffer
an accident—they will tend to refuse the offer, and go without insurance
(i.e., self-insure).  However, the terms will be attractive to high-risk custom-
ers, who will flock to the offer.  The insurer’s ex post claims experience will, as
a result, exceed the expected level.  In response, the insurer may raise its
price, but this will cause another round of exiting by relatively low-risk cus-
tomers.  Adverse selection leads to an unraveling of the insurance market,
where in the limit self-insurance is the only option.106
This process could occur in the product market setting as well, under a
regime of strict products liability.107  Suppose the set of product consumers
consists of low-risk consumers, who because of their carefulness are unlikely
to suffer an injury from using the product, and high-risk customers, who
105 See KARL H. BORCH, ECONOMICS OF INSURANCE 317 (Knut K. Aase & Agnar Sandmo
eds., 1990); George L. Priest, The Antitrust Suits and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63
TUL. L. REV. 999, 1011 (1989).
106 See Priest, supra note 105, at 1011. R
107 See Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
645, 667–68 (1985).  Epstein argues that adverse selection, while relatively diminished in
the commercial car insurance industry due to the customizable nature of insurance cover-
age, occurs in the mandatory insurance tied to car sales under a strict products liability
regime, because manufacturers “cannot differentiate between the retiree who drives 5,000
miles a year and the commercial traveler who drives 150,000 miles.” Id. at 668; see also,
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1564
(1987) (“Those consumers who use products in typically less, rather than more, risky ways
are likely to drop out of the consumer pool if tort law requires the manufacturer to insure
all consumer uses.”).
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because of their carelessness are likely to suffer an injury from using the
product.  When the producer adds an insurance premium to the price, that
premium will be based on an estimate of the average expected claim.  Since
the average among low-risk customers is lower than the population average
of the product’s consumers, the low-risk consumers will find the insurance
premium excessive, and may prefer a relatively safe alternative product, or
perhaps to do without the product all together.  This implies that the manu-
facturer will be left with a relatively risky group of customers, which requires
an increase in the premium.  In the limit, the insurance premium will have to
be raised to the level necessary to provide insurance for the highest risk class
of consumers.  The output reducing effect of strict products liability will be
substantially greater than in the simple analysis presented earlier.
Consider, for example, circular power saws.  Some users will be very care-
ful with them; some will not.  The careful users will tend to read the safety
instructions and follow them.  The less careful users will disregard the safety
instructions.  One fairly common way of disregarding the safety instructions
is to remove the blade guard, in order to enhance the maneuverability of the
saw.  However, in some cases, removing the blade guard can be quite danger-
ous.108  If the producer were liable for all injuries to both the careful and
non-careful consumers, the liability premium attached to the price of circular
saws would be quite high, and could exceed the maximum price that many
potential users would be willing to pay.
ii. Moral Hazard
Closely connected to the problem of adverse selection is moral hazard.
The term refers to the insurance customer’s change in conduct after he has
entered into the insurance agreement.109  For example, a car owner who is
fully insured against loss may take less care to prevent car theft.  This change
in behavior, induced by insurance, leads to an increase in the probability of a
claim.
Moral hazard may be observed in the products liability context.  The
likelihood of being harmed by a product is in many instances a function of
the product user’s conduct.  Insurance may weaken the incentives of the user
to take care to avoid injury.  Admittedly the argument sounds weak in the
case where the product user faces a risk of personal injury.  Few product
users would allow themselves to suffer a significant injury merely because
they knew they could be compensated by the manufacturer.110  However,
there are instances in which product-related insurance may alter the behav-
ior of the consumer/user.  A consumer may think that the likelihood of per-
sonal injury for a certain product is extremely low, while the probability of
property injury is high.  Given that the product involves a tradeoff between
108 See, e.g., Hood v. Ryobi Am. Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 609–10 (4th Cir. 1999) (describing
plaintiff’s injuries from circular saw with the guard removed).
109 See BORCH, supra note 105, at 317. R
110 Dorfman, supra note 40, at 101-02. R
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different types of property, one accompanied by liability insurance and the
other not, the consumer may have a weaker incentive to take care to avoid
property injury caused by the product that is accompanied by liability insur-
ance.  Suppose, to take a concrete example, a consumer purchases a light
bulb for a shed that stores old yard equipment.  The consumer discovers that
the light bulb has a relatively high risk of catching fire.  He may choose to go
ahead and install the dangerous light bulb, rather than discard it and
purchase a new one, if he knows that liability insurance will cover the prop-
erty loss due to the faulty light bulb.
Moral hazard can be present in personal injury settings too.  Consider
the case of a printing press operator who has to choose how much to invest
in safety training (operational safety) or in equipment to reduce the risk of
employees getting their clothing or body parts trapped in the printing
machine.  The operator may invest less in the safety of his operations, aware
that an employee who gets his hand caught in a machine is likely to sue the
machine manufacturer rather than pursue a workers’ compensation
claim.111
Of course, this is not all there is to the matter.  Perhaps it is cheaper for
the machine manufacturer to install safety equipment than for the operator
to enhance the safety of his operation.  If this is so, the market will result in
operators purchasing the level of safety they desire in the machine.  Those
who can provide safety cheaply will purchase relatively dangerous machines
and invest in the additional operational safety on their own.  But they may
choose not to do so if they find that they can save even more money by rely-
ing on the implicit insurance provided by the law.
Moral hazard results in a claims experience that is greater than antici-
pated by the product manufacturer.  This exacerbates the output reduction
effect of strict products liability.
iii. Correlated and Cascading Claims
Insurance is difficult to offer when claims are positively correlated.112  In
the standard life or health insurance setting we typically do not see positively
111 See Caroline Mitchell, Products Liability, Workmen’s Compensation and the Industrial
Accident, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 349, 370 (1976) (explaining that because recovery under work-
men’s compensation is limited by statute, an employee will choose to sue the manufac-
turer, because full compensation is possible under this option); see also Liriano v. Hobart
Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 266 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming partial judgment against meat grinder
manufacturer whom grocery store employee successfully sued, on the basis of failure-to-
warn liability, after injuring his hand in a meat grinder without the safety guard, which had
been removed by his employer, who was also found liable); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 348
N.E.2d 571, 578-79 (N.Y. 1976) (adopting strict products liability in case where printing-
press operator sued manufacturer, under negligence in design and breach of warranty
theories, after injuring hand while performing dangerous maneuver assented to by
employer).
112 Priest, supra note 105, at 1011 (“In such cases, there is no comparative advantage to R
market insurance over self-insurance.”).
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correlated claims.  The likelihood of one insurance customer dying from a
heart attack does not influence the likelihood that another customer will die
from a similar event.  By holding a large portfolio of potential claims, the
insurer can virtually eliminate uncertainty connected to the expected pay-
ment of claims within a fixed time period.
When claims are positively correlated, however, the insurer cannot virtu-
ally eliminate uncertainty with respect to expected payouts by holding a large
portfolio.  This is a phenomenon we observe in the case of natural disasters,
such as earthquakes and hurricanes.  If one person claims, we are likely to see
hundreds of others claiming.
Insurance is not impossible in the context of correlated claims.  We
observe earthquake and hurricane insurance.  However, because of special
difficulties in these markets, we often see state mandates requiring that the
insurance be offered and sometimes state subsidies to encourage customers
to purchase the insurance.113
The claims experiences connected to various products differ.  With
respect to most products on the market, we are unlikely to see positively cor-
related claims.  However, with respect to some products, we should anticipate
positive correlation.  For example, products that affect health and the envi-
ronment are likely to generate positively correlated claims.  The asbestos
cases and the silicone implant cases provide examples.  Asbestos claims have
flooded the courts over the past thirty years.114  Once established as present-
ing a health risk, asbestos generated an avalanche of products liability claims.
Similarly, silicone implants generated an avalanche of claims.115  However,
the scientific evidence of causation has never been established with respect to
silicone implants.116  The silicone claims appear to have been strategic
efforts by plaintiffs to gain compensation for illnesses unconnected to sili-
cone implants.
I prefer to think of the silicone implant example as one of cascading
claims rather than correlated claims.  I use the term cascade here to refer to a
process in which a legal theory is adopted successively by actors who have
rational bases to do so.  In the silicone context, the scientific causation evi-
113 For example, California law requires insurance companies offering residential prop-
erty insurance to provide residents earthquake insurance. See About Earthquake Insurance,
CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY, http://www.earthquakeauthority.com/index.aspx?id=13
(last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
114 STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxiv–xxv, 1 (2005), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG162.pdf. (finding 20,000 indi-
viduals had filed asbestos claims by the early 1980s and 730,000 individuals had filed such
claims through 2002).
115 See In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482, 485-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing the
flood of silicone breast implant claims which forced Dow Corning into bankruptcy); John
C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343,
1408-10 (1995) (describing the Silicone Gel class action settlement in which more than
430,000 individuals filed claims).
116 See David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457, 477-84 (1999)
(book review).
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dence suggests that the avalanche of claims was the result of a concerted
effort to create a pool of funds for the purpose of compensating claimants
and lawyers.  The heart of the process is an information cascade rather than a
natural disaster generating positively correlated injury claims.117  In the
information cascade process, one lawyer or group of lawyers proposes a the-
ory of injury causation, which is passed on to other lawyers and widely adver-
tised to the public.  Lawyers have incentives to join the cascade, even if they
privately doubt the underlying causal theory.  The reason is that as more
claims join the cascade, the greater the probability that the target will be
forced to settle rather than fight all of the claims in court.  Thus, cascading
claims generate a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The correlated and cascading claims scenarios imply that the output
reduction effect of strict products liability can be substantially larger than
anticipated.  Like adverse selection, this is a case in which the output reduc-
tion effect can reach such a level that the product cannot be offered.  This is
perhaps not a troubling result in the case of some products, such as asbestos,
where the harms are generally well understood in terms of causation princi-
ples.118  It is a troubling result, however, in the cases where plaintiffs’ causal
theories are invalid or unsupported by science.
2. Design Choice Effects
The discussion in Part III.B.2.b of the design choice implications of strict
products liability assumed, as did the initial presentation of consumption
effects, that there are no litigation costs, and that courts are perfectly accu-
rate as well as predictable.  If courts are not accurate and if litigation costs are
substantial, there is no guarantee that strict products liability will optimally
regulate the design choice decision.  The liability system may “over-internal-
ize” or “under-internalize” injury costs to the producer, depending on
whether damages typically exceed the cost of bringing a claim to court.  In
other words, products liability may tax the producer by an amount that
exceeds the expected value of the injury risks it creates, or by an amount that
is less than the value of the risks it creates.  Since products liability damages
are likely to exceed the cost of bringing a claim to court, and given the active
117 On information cascades generally, see Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer &
Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades,
100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992).  The theory of information cascades has been applied mostly
in the area of finance. See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Invest-
ment, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 465 (1990).  However, it clearly applies to the development of class
actions.  The only application of cascade theory to litigation examines possible cascades,
within the common law, based on precedent. See Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An
Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87 (1999).
118 Even in the case of asbestos there is a question as to the availability of adequate
alternatives.  Asbestos has served as a fire retardant for centuries, and could very well have
prevented many more injuries than it has caused—most people would prefer reduced lung
function to death in a fire. See Keith N. Hylton, Asbestos and Mass Torts with Fraudulent
Victims, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 575, 578-79 (2008).
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class action practice in products liability,119 the more plausible result is over-
internalization of risk costs to the producer.
In addition, the insurance market inefficiencies discussed earlier could
easily lead to inefficient regulatory outcomes.  If adverse selection occurs in
the market for the risky product, leading to excessive purchases by high-risk
consumers, the liability system will internalize to the producer costs that
exceed the expected risk costs based on the entire population of consumers.
As a consequence, the costs shifted to producers as a result of products liabil-
ity may be significantly larger than the real risk costs generated by the
products.
On the assumption that liability costs to producers over-internalize the
risk-related costs, products liability law will not optimally regulate the design
choice.  Since the risk cost internalized to the producer is likely to exceed the
injury risk to the consumer, producers will be excessively reluctant to adopt
net-positive utility designs that entail additional risk to consumers.
Now consider innovation, under the assumption that liability over-inter-
nalizes risk costs to producers.  I noted earlier, in the analysis under ideal
conditions (no litigation costs, uncertainty, etc.), that strict products liability
failed to provide optimal innovation incentives, but that the liability rule did
not alter the outcome that would be observed in a full-information market.
With litigation costs taken into account, strict products liability exacerbates
the divergence between the private and social incentive to innovate.  Relative
to a market in which consumers are fully informed, products liability exces-
sively discourages innovation.
D. Effects of Legal Tests
The preceding discussion examined the effects of liability under a very
simple rule of strict or absolute liability.  Of course, the law has not generally
adopted such a test—the closest the law comes to it is the strict liability rule
that applies to manufacturing defects.  The general tests adopted in the law
are the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test.  In this Part I will
119 See Deborah R. Hensler, Has the Fat Lady Sung? The Future of Mass Toxic Torts, 26 REV.
LITIG. 883 (2007).  Hensler reviews multi-district litigation data and finds a dramatic
increase in class action activity in products liability over the 1990s and through 2006. See
id. at 907.  Hensler also reviews law firm activity—filings, industry reports, and advertise-
ments—and concludes that the mass tort practice remains “vibrant.” See id. at 921-22. See
also Lester Brickman, The Use of Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for Fraud?, 61
SMU L. REV. 1221, 1223 & nn.1-5 (2008) (noting that mass tort litigation, which Brickman
defines as claims by large numbers of people who have ingested, inhaled, or implanted a
product into their body that is harmful, is “often in the form of a class action, mass consoli-
dation, or other aggregative form, but also may simply involve thousands of substantially
similar individual claims”). Cf. Jesse Tiko Smallwood, Nationwide, State Law Class Actions
and the Beauty of Federalism, 53 DUKE L.J. 1137, 1156-57 & nn.116-18 (2004) (noting a trend
away from products liability class actions being heard in federal courts, and a simultaneous
move to state courts, following the heightened standard for settlement classes announced
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997)).
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examine the incentive effects of these tests, taking advantage of the argu-
ments developed in the foregoing analysis of the strict producer liability rule.
1. Consumer Expectations Test
a. Consumption and Design Incentives
Although the preceding analysis examined a simple version of strict lia-
bility, the analysis explains the effects of the consumer expectations test, the
first test for liability proposed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.120  Under
the consumer expectations test, the manufacturer is strictly liable for defec-
tive conditions of which the consumer is unaware, and is not liable when the
consumer is fully aware of the defective conditions.121  The consumer expec-
tations test is an especially refined form of strict producer liability that
imposes liability when consumers are uninformed and provides immunity
from liability when consumers are informed.
Based on the preceding analysis, and all of its simplifying assumptions,
the consumer expectations test is an optimal rule for regulating consumption decisions.
The rule internalizes the costs of injury risk to manufacturers when consum-
ers are not aware of them, and this leads to optimal production decisions.
On the other hand, when consumers are fully aware of the risk costs, the
consumer expectations test leaves them to suffer the costs of their decisions,
which leads to optimal consumption choices.  As the preceding analysis indi-
cates, optimal consumption patterns result from the consumer expectations
test.
As for product design decisions, the preceding analysis implies, again,
that the consumer expectations test provides an optimal regulatory frame-
work, in the sense that the test leads the producer to choose the risky design
when and only when the incremental utility from the risky design is greater
than its incremental risk.  If the incremental risk exceeds the incremental
utility, and consumers are uninformed, the liability imposed under the con-
sumer expectations test would induce the manufacturer to choose the safe
design instead of the risky design.  If the incremental risk is less than the
incremental utility, and consumers are uninformed, the liability imposed
under the consumer expectations test would not alter the manufacturer’s
preference for the risky design.  If consumers are informed, the consumer
expectations test permits the market to regulate design choice, which is pref-
erable in that case.
The consumer expectations test’s only potential flaw becomes apparent
when we consider innovation.  Although the test appears to lead to optimal
choices between two existing product designs, it replicates the market’s
incentives when it comes to innovation of new product designs that improve
consumer welfare.
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
121 Id.
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b. Real-World Complications: Consumer Expectations Test
As commentators have noted, there are practical problems in imple-
menting a consumer expectations test.122  Some consumers may be fully
aware of the risks while other consumers are not.  Whose awareness level
should the consumer expectations test incorporate?  My analysis to this point
does not address these practical issues.  I have considered an ideal setting in
which the consumer expectations test can be applied with perfect accuracy
and without administrative costs.  Under such a setting, the test leads to opti-
mal consumption patterns in the market and in optimal design decisions by
manufacturers.
Once practical implementation issues are taken into account, the effects
of the consumer expectations test on consumption and design choices are
quite unlikely to be optimal.  The first set of practical issues involves the
administrative costs and insurance market inefficiencies surveyed earlier.
When these factors are taken into account, the market-shrinking effect of
strict liability will be far greater than predicted under an analysis that ignores
these costs.  The cascading-claims problem discussed earlier would be suffi-
cient to severely restrict the scope of a market under strict, consumer-expec-
tations based, products liability.
The second set of practical issues involves the problem of inherent and
unobservable risk.  For modern complex products, such as the automobile,
there are bound to be many features that can be viewed as creating or impos-
ing risk on the consumer that the consumer will not be able to assess before
purchase.  Each of these features could form the basis of a products liability
lawsuit grounded in the consumer expectations theory.  Because the exis-
tence of such features is virtually unavoidable from the manufacturer’s per-
spective, the consumer expectations test effectively converts the
manufacturer into an insurer.  In spite of the appearance of a safe harbor
based on the obviousness of risk, the consumer expectations test operates in
effect as strict liability.
To provide a concrete example of the problem of inherent and unob-
servable risk, consider the choice between the X-frame and box-frame
cars.123  The X-frame car is designed to crumple inward in response to a side
collision.  The crumpling inward of the car body absorbs some of the force of
the collision, and in this sense reduces the risk of a more severe injury to the
driver.  However, some injured consumers have brought products liability
lawsuits on the theory that the X-frame car is defectively designed—precisely
because it crumples inward.  The alternative to the X-frame is the box-frame,
which in theory protects the driver by reducing the likelihood that the car
body will crumple inward.  But the box-frame introduces its own dangers.
The force of a blow is more likely to be transmitted directly to the people
122 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 58, at 879–82, 904. R
123 See Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding district
court’s judgment against the automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained to the plain-
tiff police officer); infra text accompanying note 130. R
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inside the car, causing them to shift position violently.  Injuries can result to
the driver or passenger from being thrown against the windshield or side of
the car.
Given these descriptions, both the X-frame and box-frame could be
treated as dangerous features whose risks are not obvious to the consumer.
In other words, both frames violate the consumer expectations test, and both
designs would justify damage awards under the test.  But if both frames would
subject the manufacturer to liability on the basis of consumer expectations,
how can the manufacturer choose which design is optimal?
One could argue that litigation experience should guide the manufac-
turer to the optimal design.  The manufacturer will pay more in damages for
the design that leads to the most injuries.  But this is extremely wishful think-
ing in connection to the litigation process.  The relative numbers of claims
may not precisely track the relative risks of each design within any given time
period.  Moreover, the chosen frame design may be necessary to reduce or
offset some other feature that might be viewed as a source of risk.
The tradeoff problem posed by the choice between the X-frame and
box-frame is probably replicated over many other features of a car design.
Given the existence of many features that could be viewed as sources of unob-
servable risk, the consumer expectations test would be unlikely to send care-
fully calibrated signals guiding the manufacturer toward the optimal tradeoff
between safety and utility.
Henderson and Twerski argue that the scope of the consumer expecta-
tions test is unclear, because there may be cases in which the expectation of
the ordinary consumer cannot be discerned easily, or, even if discernible,
may be irrelevant to the regulatory issues at hand.124
Henderson and Twerski’s argument suggests that the uncertainty is
more troubling because of the difficulty that a firm would find in predicting
outcomes under the test.125  The consumer expectations test depends on a
determination—specifically, the expectation of the consumer—that the pro-
ducer may not be able to predict with any reasonable degree of accuracy at
the time of production.
However, I think the core problem is not that the scope of the consumer
expectations test is unclear.  The scope might be unclear at an early phase of
its application, but over time its implications would become clear.  The
124 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 58, at 880–81.  For example, suppose a design R
change that reduces one risk enhances a different risk.  How should courts resolve the
conflict between expectations?  What if some consumers are risk-neutral and others are
risk-averse?  What if consumers are not aware of the technological alternatives, so that their
expectations have no bearing on the feasible set of solutions to the design safety problem?
These are just a few of the excellent questions Henderson and Twerski raise in connection
with the consumer expectations test. Id.  One could add more issues.  For example, as the
set of consumers change over time, how can a manufacturer predict and conform to expec-
tations?  What if consumers claim to have had their expectations distorted by advertising?
See Garrison v. Heublein, Inc., 673 F.2d 189, 189 (7th Cir. 1982); Williams v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 127 P.3d 1165, 1168–70 (Ore. 2006).
125 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 58, at 880–82. R
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greater problem is that the scope of liability under the consumer expecta-
tions test is unbounded in connection with products that have complex
designs.  The manufacturer could not design around the problem of inher-
ent and unobservable risk.  Hence, the consumer expectations test would
operate effectively as strict liability.
When the practical implementation issues are brought into view, it is not
clear, even in theory, that the consumer expectations test will generate opti-
mal consumption levels.  The social desirability of a consumer expectations-
based products liability test is ultimately an empirical question.
2. Risk-Utility Test
Courts have generally embraced the risk-utility test in product design
challenges.126  In this Part I will examine the effects of the risk-utility test on
consumption, precaution in design, and innovation.  Consistent with the pre-
vious analysis I will start with the assumption that the test is implemented
flawlessly by courts that operate with perfect accuracy.  Practical questions
about implementation and error will be considered only after examining the
test under ideal conditions.
a. Consumption Effects of the Risk-Utility Test
Unlike the consumer expectations test (examined under ideal condi-
tions), the risk-utility test does not (examined under ideal conditions) gener-
ate optimal consumption levels when consumers are uninformed as to the
product risks.
The risk-utility test deems a product defective in design if the additional
risks imposed by the design, compared to a safer alternative,127 are not rea-
sonable in light of the additional utility of the challenged design.128  The risk-
utility test envisions a comparison between the challenged design and some
comparatively safe alternative.  The court compares the incremental risk
characteristics of the challenged design to those of the alternative.  Using the
terms defined previously, the product is unreasonably defective if and only if
R > U.
Return to the car design choice discussed previously.  Assume consumers
are fully aware of the risk characteristics of the product, and can observe the
utility characteristics as well.  Suppose, in addition, that the incremental risk
exceeds the incremental utility, for the risky design.  The risk-utility test will
require the imposition of liability on the manufacturer.  As we saw in the
previous discussion,129 when consumers are fully aware of the product’s risks,
imposing liability does not alter the market equilibrium quantity that
126 See Twerski & Henderson, supra note 10, at 1073–1106 (summarizing judicial treat- R
ment of risk-utility).
127 For a discussion emphasizing the role of the safer alternative, see Henderson &
Twerski, supra note 58, at 882–87. R
128 See OWEN, supra note 59, at 524–31. R
129 See supra Part III.D.1.
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emerges in the absence of liability.  The only effect of strict liability is to raise
the price to reflect the forced sale of an insurance policy. Thus, under the risk-
utility test, with informed consumers, the market equilibrium consumption level will be
optimal.
Now suppose consumers are unaware of the risk characteristics of the
product, though they can observe the utility characteristics.  Suppose also
that incremental risk exceeds incremental utility.  Since consumers can
observe the additional utility of the risky product, their demand for the risky
product will reflect this additional expected utility.  In the absence of pro-
ducer liability, the market would result in excessive consumption.130  Under
the risk-utility test, the seller will be held liable in this example because incre-
mental risk exceeds incremental utility.  The resulting market equilibrium
generates the optimal consumption level because the injury costs associated
with the product, which are unknown to consumers, are internalized by the
producer.131  Strict liability, imposed under the risk-utility test, achieves the
goal of reducing consumption of the risky product to the optimal level.
Now let us consider the case where the incremental risk is less than the
incremental utility, i.e., R < U, as shown in Figure 4.  The seller will not be
liable under the risk-utility test.  As we have seen, that does not alter the mar-
ket outcome when consumers are fully aware of the product’s risk character-
istics.  However, if consumers are not aware of the product’s risk features, the
market equilibrium generates an excessive level of consumption—because
consumers are unaware of the product’s risks and the risks are not internal-
ized to the producer.  By exempting the seller from liability, the risk-utility
test results in over-consumption of the risky product when incremental utility
exceeds incremental risk.  In Figure 4, the consumption level is associated
with point A’, which is greater than the optimal consumption level associated
with point B.
The upshot of this analysis is that under ideal conditions—no litigation
costs, no insurance-market inefficiencies, perfectly accurate courts— the con-
sumption effects of the risk-utility test depend on whether the incremental risk associated
with the product is greater or less than the incremental utility.  If the risk is greater than
the utility, the test generates optimal consumption levels.  If the risk is less than the
utility, the test leads to over-consumption of risky products.
b. Design Choice Effects of the Risk-Utility Test
In this Part, I will consider product design decisions under the risk-utility
test.  Recall that under strict products liability, the unit profit differential
between the risky and safe model, assuming the producer chooses the same
quantity, is equal to the difference between the incremental utility and the
incremental risk, U – R.  It should be clear that when the incremental risk
130 Specifically, since the seller is not liable, the market equilibrium will be determined
by the intersection of the safe seller’s supply curve and the demand curve for the risky
product. See supra Figure 2, point A.
131 Supra Figure 2, point B.
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FIGURE 4: R < U
exceeds the incremental utility, liability will discourage the producer from
choosing the risky design.  His profit is potentially greater if he chooses the
safe design.
When the incremental risk of a new product design is less than the incre-
mental utility, the risk-utility test imposes no liability on the producer who
chooses to sell the risky product.  Thus, when the risk is less than the utility,
the unit profit differential between the risk and safe models is equal to the
incremental utility.
It follows that the risk-utility test, like the consumer expectations test,
always encourages the seller to make optimal design choices, in the sense of
inducing the producer to choose the safe product whenever incremental risk
exceeds incremental utility, and to choose the risky product when its incre-
mental utility exceeds its incremental risk.  The difference between the risk-
utility test and the consumer expectations test is that the risk-utility test allows
the producer to retain a larger profit when he chooses to design new prod-
ucts that impose some risk on consumers, whenever the incremental risk is
less than the incremental utility.  In other words, the risk-utility test encour-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-5\NDL514.txt unknown Seq: 39  9-AUG-13 10:57
2013] the  law  and  economics  of  products  liability 2495
ages innovation toward net-positive utility designs, by spreading the payoffs to
the producer between the net-positive utility and net-negative utility designs.
The effective subsidy in the direction of net-positive utility designs is
potentially optimal in light of the gap between private and social incentives
to innovate discussed in Part III.B.2.b.  Innovation provides a positive exter-
nality, from the perspective of the innovator, in the form of new surplus to
consumers.  By completely eliminating liability for designs for which incre-
mental utility exceeds incremental risk, the risk-utility test provides a subsidy
that encourages welfare-enhancing product innovation, potentially moving it
closer to the optimal rate.
3. Real-World Complications
The foregoing analysis of the risk-utility test has assumed ideal condi-
tions: no judicial error, no administrative or litigation costs, no insurance
market inefficiencies.  It suggests that the risk-utility test is inferior to the
consumer expectations test in terms of its effects on consumption.  The con-
sumer expectations test leads to optimal consumption levels generally while
the risk-utility test generates optimal consumption levels only when incre-
mental risk exceeds incremental utility, and excessive consumption when
incremental risk is less than incremental utility.  In terms of effects on prod-
uct design incentives, the two tests are equivalent in their effects on the
incentive to choose between two existing designs.  The risk-utility test is
potentially superior to the consumer expectations test in terms of its effects
on product design innovation.
In this Section, I will complicate the analysis by taking some real-world
matters into account.  I will consider the consumption effects of the risk-util-
ity test when legal process is costly and courts make mistakes.  Then I will
examine design choice effects of the risk-utility test.
a. Consumption Effects, Risk-Utility, with Error and Costs
First, consider the effects of administrative costs and uncertain applica-
tion of the law on consumption patterns.  These factors suggest that the mar-
ket shrinking effect of producer liability will be greater than predicted under
the ideal conditions analysis that assumed no litigation costs or judicial error.
For designs in which the incremental risk exceeds the incremental utility, the
costs of litigation and of uncertainty will push consumption levels below the
optimal level.  For designs in which the incremental risk is less than the incre-
mental utility—where the legal test would exempt firms from liability if the
law were applied without error—the presence of a significant risk of liability
due to error will lead to a corresponding increase in price and reduction in
consumption.  Whether there would be over-consumption—as predicted in
the ideal conditions scenario (Figure 4)—or under-consumption is an empir-
ical question.  Under-consumption could result if the sum of the costs of liti-
gation and expected liability due to error exceeds the injury costs of the risky
design.
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b. Design Incentives, Risk-Utility, with Error and Costs
Now consider product design decisions under the risk-utility test.  In the
ideal conditions setting (no litigation costs, and no uncertainty in the test’s
application), the risk-utility test encourages innovation toward safer designs.
With litigation costs and uncertainty taken into account, the subsidy toward
relatively safe innovation is probably less generous, though still present.
Litigation costs will burden both net-positive utility designs (i.e., for
which incremental utility exceeds incremental risk) and net-negative utility
designs.  However, as long as plaintiffs are more likely to sue the sellers of
net-negative utility designs, which is a reasonable assumption, litigation costs
will tend to be a greater burden for sellers of net-negative utility designs.
This implies that even with litigation costs taken into account, the risk-utility
test’s subsidy for safety innovation remains.
The effects of uncertainty on design incentives are more complicated.
In the presence of uncertainty as to its application, the risk-utility test proba-
bly gives producers an incentive to err toward high net-positive utility
designs.  The effect of the risk-utility test is to encourage excessive investment
in reducing risk in the region of designs that generate the most uncertainty
regarding the outcome of the legal test.  In other words, if a manufacturer is
considering a design for which the court’s likely assessment of the balance
between incremental risk and incremental utility is unclear, the manufac-
turer is likely to have an incentive under the test to err toward safety.  This is
analogous to the proposition, first offered by Mark Grady, that the negli-
gence test, in the absence of a rigorous causation inquiry, encourages exces-
sive investment in precaution when the actor’s level of precaution is a range
in which the outcome of the negligence test is uncertain.132  The reason the
negligence test leads to socially excessive precaution is because, as Grady
noted, there is a discontinuous jump in liability once the actor crosses the
negligence threshold.133  The same argument applies to the risk-utility test in
the products liability setting.  When the producer is in the region of product
design space where the outcome of the liability test is uncertain, the pro-
ducer would experience a discontinuous jump in liability risk as he crosses
the threshold for liability—unless courts are rigorous and accurate in their
analysis of causation.  As a result, the risk-utility test, in the presence of uncer-
tainty as to its application, is likely to provide a strong inducement toward
maximizing the differential between incremental utility and incremental
risk.134
132 See Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J. 799,
806–13 (1983).
133 Id. at 805–06.
134 Under Grady’s analysis, if courts are accurate in their application of causation analy-
sis, the inducement toward excessive precaution in design will not be observed.  Design
incentives will be optimal.  The inducement toward excessive precaution depends on the
presence of uncertainty in the application of the legal standard and a failure of courts to
reliably and accurately apply causation principles. Id. at 803–06.  My argument here
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However, if the risk of erroneous findings of liability is sufficiently great,
the risk-utility test could have the perverse incentive of inducing producers to
abandon designs that impose additional risk on consumers, irrespective of
the differential between incremental utility and incremental risk.  Suppose
the producer fears that it cannot escape the burden of liability by increasing
the differential between incremental utility and incremental risk.  In this
worst-case scenario, the producer may choose to abandon innovation rather
than attempt to aim for a high net-positive utility design.
This suggests that in the presence of uncertainty over the application of
the risk-utility test, one should observe different effects of the test.  The test
alters incentives for a special type of precaution (specifically, aiming for high
net-positive utility designs) in the design process, but it also affects incentives
to engage in the activity of design (that is, innovation).  If the likelihood of
an erroneous finding of liability is relatively low, the precaution effect should
predominate, generating a push toward high value designs.  If the uncer-
tainty is relatively high, the activity effect should predominate, discouraging
design efforts altogether.
This is consistent with the analysis of legal uncertainty by Richard Cras-
well and John Calfee.135  In examining the effects of uncertainty with respect
to the due-care standard in the application of a legal test, Craswell and Calfee
find that low levels of uncertainty resulted in excessive precaution, while high
levels of uncertainty resulted in inadequate precaution.136  The intuitive rea-
son is that with low levels of uncertainty, the punishing effect of crossing the
legal threshold forces the actor to take excessive care—which is the effect
identified by Mark Grady.137  With high levels of uncertainty, the actor is
punished whether he complies with the law or not, and so takes less care.  In
the case of products liability, high levels of uncertainty are likely to be met
with withdrawal from the product innovation process.
IV. REMAINING TOPICS: MANUFACTURING DEFECTS, FAILURE-TO-WARN CLAIMS
I have to this point focused on design defect claims.  I consider this a
reasonable allocation of attention, since the other major areas of modern
products liability litigation are far less controversial.  The other major areas
are manufacturing defect litigation and failure-to-warn litigation.
assumes that courts will not be perfect in applying causation principles; and because of this
imperfection, there will be some inducement toward excessive precaution.
135 John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 974–84 (1984).  The empirical evidence is consistent with the
prediction in the text. See MICHAEL J. MOORE & W. KIP VISCUSI, PRODUCT LIABILITY ENTER-
ING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 25–27 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ct. for Regulatory Studies,
2001).
136 See Calfee & Craswell, supra note 135, at 974–84. R
137 See Grady, supra note 132, at 805–06. R
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A. Manufacturing Defects
Recall that manufacturing defects refer to products that deviate from the
manufacturer’s design or from the standard result of the manufacturing pro-
cess.  In other words, they are the infrequent glitches that come out of the
manufacturing process.  When the glitch is one that presents a risk of harm
to the consumer, then the manufacturer is held strictly liable for the injury to
the consumer.  For example, suppose a plastic soft drink bottle has a glitch in
the form of a stray jagged piece of plastic jutting out from the side.  If a
consumer cuts his hand on the stray piece of plastic, he can bring a strict
liability claim against the bottle maker.
In the absence of strict liability for manufacturing defects, manufactur-
ers could be held liable for such defects only on the basis of negligence.  In
many cases, courts would find manufacturers liable on the basis of res ipsa
loquitur doctrine.138  However, consumers may not be able to take advantage
of res ipsa loquitur in every case involving a manufacturing defect.  Courts
might find that the conditions necessary for the res ipsa doctrine to apply are
not satisfied in some manufacturing defect cases—for example, a court
might conclude the failure of some component could easily occur in the
absence of the manufacturer’s negligence.  In addition, courts might find
that the manufacturer’s production process incorporates reasonable precau-
tion, and on that ground refuse to find the manufacturer negligent.  This is
an especially likely outcome as manufacturing processes become more effi-
cient over time.  Consequently, applying the negligence rule to manufactur-
ing defect cases would not be equivalent to applying strict liability.  This
implies that the liability burden on the manufacturer would be lighter under
the negligence rule than under strict liability.
The arguments provided in the previous parts of this Article apply read-
ily to the manufacturing defect cases.  If consumers are unaware of the likeli-
hood of being injured by a manufacturing defect, then strict liability will
result in a market consumption level that is optimal, under ideal conditions
(i.e., in the absence of substantial litigation costs and insurance-market ineffi-
ciencies).  Manufacturing defect liability can be viewed as a special case of
the consumer expectations test that is applied in a setting in which consum-
ers are unlikely to be aware of the risk.  However, if consumers are aware of
the precise risk of confronting a manufacturing defect in a particular prod-
uct, then strict liability would serve only to impose a costly and inefficient
form of insurance onto the market.  Thus, under the ideal conditions, strict
liability is preferable to negligence where consumers are unaware of the risk
of a defective condition.  Negligence is preferable to strict liability when con-
sumers know the precise risk of a defective condition.
When litigation costs and insurance-market inefficiencies are taken into
account, the choice between strict liability and negligence becomes less clear
in the manufacturing defect setting.  The comparison depends in part on the
litigation outcomes under the negligence rule—that is, whether the negli-
138 See supra note 37. R
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gence rule operates in a manner nearly equivalent to strict liability, or
whether the negligence rule leads to a substantially lower liability risk relative
to strict liability.  I will adhere to the assumption that it leads to a substantially
lower liability risk, which is plausible in light of the tendency for manufactur-
ing processes to become more efficient over time.139
Assume, then, that the negligence rule would impose a relatively light
liability burden on the manufacturer for manufacturing defects.  When litiga-
tion costs and insurance-market inefficiencies are incorporated into the anal-
ysis, strict liability clearly would push consumption levels below the optimal
level.  Negligence, in contrast, would probably result in over-consumption,
since manufacturers would frequently escape liability.  Both outcomes are
inefficient, and the choice between the two involves comparing relative
inefficiencies.
One feature that should play an important role in the analysis is the
trend toward safety, an empirical fact frequently noted by scholars who are
critical of products liability law.140  Products have become safer over time, as
consumers demand more in terms of quality.  In view of this trend, the mar-
ket is likely to produce a paradox of safety: as consumers anticipate high levels
of safety in general, their expectation of danger diminishes to the point that
it is no longer a useful means of distinguishing products on the market.  A
consumer who must choose between a product that has a dangerous defect
in only one out of one million units and another product that has a danger-
ous defect in only one out of two million units will be inclined to ignore the
difference between the two products.  Perceptions of risk differences at such
a microscopic level effectively fade into the background.  Consumer demand
will no longer sort dangerous from safe products.
When the safety paradox holds, the prevalence of safety dulls risk sensi-
tivity as a means of discernment, and the case for strict liability for manufac-
turing defects strengthens.  Manufacturing defects, unlike the design defects
139 The tendency toward greater efficiency can be attributed to manufacturing experi-
ence, within a given process, and to technological change over time.  On the experience
(or learning curve) effect, see, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economic Implications of
Learning by Doing, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 155, 155–56 (1962); Marvin B. Lieberman, The
Learning Curve and Pricing in the Chemical Processing Industries, 15 RAND J. ECON. 213,
213–14 (1984).  On the effect of technological change, see Robert M. Solow, A Contribution
to the Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q. J. ECON. 65, 85–87 (1956).  As firms become more
efficient, a greater percentage of them should be able to adopt the best industry practices
and minimize defects in the manufacturing process.
140 See, e.g., George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate, in LIABILITY 184,
190–91 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988); Paul H. Rubin, Markets, Tort Law,
and Regulation to Achieve Safety 2 (Emory Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 11-
142, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1727607.  Priest presents data on work-
related deaths, which show a steady decline over the period of his sample. See Priest, supra,
at 191.  The death numbers are reliable because they are unlikely to be distorted by report-
ing practices.  Priest also presents evidence of product-related injuries, collected by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission. See id. at 192–93.  Unlike the death numbers, these
accident numbers are likely to be distorted by reporting practices.
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examined earlier, generally fall in the class of unobservable risk characteris-
tics, at least when a consumer observes a particular product.  However, repu-
tation and general quality perceptions could in theory permit consumers to
distinguish products according to their probabilities of a dangerous manufac-
turing defect.  But this is unlikely to occur when the probabilities of a danger-
ous defect appearing are infinitesimal.
B. Failure to Warn
Failure to warn litigation is perhaps the least controversial area of prod-
ucts liability, in terms of the basic economic function of the law.  Courts do
not apply the various strict liability theories examined earlier to failure to
warn cases; they are decided on the basis of the negligence test.141  That
implies a comparison of the losses that could be avoided by issuing a warning
to the burden of issuing a warning.
It might seem obvious at first glance that producers should lose these
cases.  The benefits of a warning can be substantial—enabling the consumer
to avoid life-altering injury—while the costs of a warning appear to be trivial.
The producer need only type out a warning on a sheet of paper attached to
the product.
However, courts have noted that the costs of warning are not necessarily
trivial.142  For some products, the number of consumer-product interactions
that could lead to injury is large.  A manufacturer who warns of each possible
interaction that could result in injury might overwhelm the consumer with so
much information that he chooses not to read the warning manual.143  Alter-
natively, a consumer who reads each warning carefully may discover yet
another injurious interaction with the product that is outside of the specific
interactions covered in the warning manual.  For these reasons courts have
sometimes relieved manufacturers of a duty to warn of specific injurious
interactions.
The failure-to-warn case law generates novel issues that are not observed
in the run-of-the-mill negligence cases.  For example, courts have adopted a
heeding presumption that effectively shifts the burden on causation (would
the consumer have changed his conduct in the light of the warning?) to the
141 See, e.g., McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co., 981 F.2d 656, 658 n.2 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Ver-
mont appears to have adopted the position that in failure to warn cases, a strict liability
claim and a negligence claim are essentially the same.”); Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570
N.E.2d 198, 203 (N.Y. 1991) (“[L]iability here is predicated on a failure to warn of dangers
of which the manufacturers knew or with adequate testing should have known.  Such a
claim, though it may be couched in terms of strict liability, is indistinguishable from a
negligence claim.” (citation omitted)).
142 See, e.g., Hood v. Ryobi America Corp., 181 F.3d 608, 611 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting
costs of information clutter in warnings); Cotton v. Buckeye Gas Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935,
937–38 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same).
143 Hood, 181 F.3d at 611 (“Well-meaning attempts to warn of every possible accident
lead over time to voluminous yet impenetrable labels—too prolix to read and too technical
to understand.”).
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manufacturer.144  However, these issues are unconnected to the economics
of strict products liability, which is the focus of this Article.
V. NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT
This Article has focused on a positive analysis of the broad incentive
effects of the rules associated with products liability law.  Its purpose has been
to provide a roadmap for courts and policymakers to use in understanding
the tradeoffs generated by the legal standards, and in reforming the system.
I am unable to say whether the products liability system enhances social wel-
fare or reduces social welfare overall.  Any assessment of the ultimate welfare
impact of products liability will have to be based on a comparison of the costs
and benefits in light of the empirical evidence.145  Still, there are some con-
clusions that can be drawn from the analysis of this paper.
In the absence of products liability there is likely to be overconsumption
of risky products and an excessive tendency on the part of producers to
choose designs with hidden risks.  There are several reasons that these bad
outcomes are probable.
If a new product design appears on the market, and its incremental risks
are obviously greater than its incremental utility, relative to some safer alter-
native available, consumers will tend not to purchase the new product.  Antic-
ipating the poor reception from consumers, producers are unlikely to bring
such products to the market, and especially unlikely to invest resources into
the innovation of such products.  In contrast, consumers do not have suffi-
cient information on the risk characteristics of complicated products to be
able to take the precise risks into account in purchasing decisions.  It follows
that the products on the market that have risks in excess of benefits to con-
sumers (relative to safer available alternatives) are likely to be those for which
the risks are unobservable or in some sense likely to be passed over by the
consumer until it is too late.
There is perhaps no better example of this problem than the injuries
caused when steering wheel designs permitted them to be jammed inward
144 See, e.g., Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 762 (Mo. 2011) (en banc); Town
of Bridport v. Sterling Clark Lurton Corp., 693 A.2d 701, 704 (Vt. 1997); House v. Armour
of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340, 347 (Utah 1996); Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710, 720
(N.J. 1993); Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex. 1986).
145 There are relatively few empirical studies of the products liability system.  I am
aware of only one empirical study that assesses the welfare impact of products liability
litigation, though only with respect to failure to warn lawsuits against drug manufacturers.
See Eric Helland et al., Tort Liability and the Market for Prescription Drugs (July 6, 2011), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1883691 (finding empirical support for the claim that
products liability litigation enhances consumer welfare in the prescription drug market).
The Helland study’s results support the theoretical arguments of this Article.  The study
finds that products liability law enhances market efficiency by pushing out of the market
the lowest quality products. Id. at 22.  The Helland study’s results contradict one of the key
recommendations of Viscusi, who argues that failure to warn litigation should be sup-
planted by regulatory standards on warnings. See VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 9–10. R
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during car collisions.146  Few consumers, if any, compared the relative risks
of steering wheel impalement in determining whether one car model would
be preferable to an alternative model.  Consumers have tended to focus on
the physical appeal of cars, functionality (e.g., ability to carry passengers),
maneuverability, and engine power.147  Injuries caused by steering wheels
were not brought to the attention of the public until Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at
Any Speed.148  It is an open question whether the steering wheel injuries
would have been designed out at the same rate even if Nader’s book had not
been published.
As a result, the vast majority of products liability cases—the portion of
product space on which the law effectively operates—involve products that
have the combination of observable utility, which attracts consumers, and
hidden risk.  This is precisely the product space in which the market is
unlikely to serve as an adequate regulator of producer incentives.  Govern-
ment is too small and cannot possibly grow large enough to effectively regu-
late such a vast area of the market.
In addition, products liability law operates on the specific set of circum-
stances in which regulation is socially desirable.149  The cases that come to
court involve real injuries, rather than faked or potential injuries.  In order to
prevail, the plaintiff has to prove that a design improvement could reduce
the risk of injury without seriously degrading the utility of the product.  The
value of this precision is best seen in comparison to alternative regulators.
The Consumer Product Safety Improvements Act of 2008 requires producers
of toys and other items children use to reduce lead content.150  In response
to the legislation, the Consumer Product Safety Commission reduced permis-
sible lead levels by two-thirds in 2011.151  However, the statute applies
broadly to products used by children without regard to the likelihood that
lead consumption will cause injury.  Take, for example, bicycles.  The law
reportedly has led to the exit of one quarter of the producers of children’s
146 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text. R
147 Such consumer preferences are still apparent today.  Consider automotive retail
websites like www.autotrader.com.  When researching an automobile, consumers can sort
automobiles based on make, model, engine size, and color.  However, there are no corre-
sponding search fields for safety. See AUTOTRADER, www.autotrader.com (last visited Mar.
12, 2013).
148 RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED 68–76 (1966).
149 Steven Shavell has argued that one reason liability is preferable to regulation is
because it operates on the parties who are most likely to cause harm. See Steven Shavell,
Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 364 (1984).
150 Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, 122 Stat.
3017 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
151 Children’s Products Containing Lead; Technological Feasibility of 100 ppm for
Lead Content; Notice of Effective Date of 100 ppm Lead Content Limit in Children’s Prod-
ucts, 76 Fed. Reg. 44463 (July 26, 2011) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500); Editorial,
Toying With Deregulation, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2011, at A18; Ellen Gabler, Acceptable Lead
Levels in Toys Cut by Two-Thirds by Consumer Product Safety Commission, CHI. TRIB. (July 14,
2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-07-14/business/ct-biz-0714-lead-toys-
20110714_1_government-safety-limits-toys-new-limit.
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bicycles, because of its reduction in allowable lead content.152  But the likeli-
hood of lead in a bicycle causing harm is low.  In comparative terms, prod-
ucts liability law would pose a threat to bicycle producers, on the basis of lead
content, only if the lead actually caused injuries.  Admittedly, this example
may not be representative of all regulatory agencies, because it reflects the
hurried response by Congress at the time to findings of high lead content in
toys from China.  But it does serve to illustrate the possible divergence in
method between regulation under the products liability laws and traditional
government agency regulation.
Given the low likelihood that regulatory agencies could manage the
scale of activity reviewed under products liability law, or could craft rules that
target with precision the product risks that should be controlled, products
liability law performs a regulatory function that could not be supplanted by
regulators.  Roughly fifty thousand product liability lawsuits are filed in fed-
eral courts each year.153  If federal regulators worked every day of the year,
they would have to examine nearly 140 serious product injury claims daily.
And even if voters were to approve the expenditure of sufficient resources for
federal agencies to handle the workload of federal courts, regulators would
be hard pressed to consistently perform as well as courts do in distinguishing
serious from trivial instances of product risk.
The negative feature of strict products liability is that it imposes a socially
excessive tax on consumption and may also discourage welfare-enhancing
product innovation.  When the costs of litigation, uncertainty of application,
and insurance-market inefficiencies are taken into account, it is likely that
the liability system excessively discourages the consumption of products with
risky features.
The normative prescription that emerges from this Article is that courts
focus on reforming products liability in order to clarify its scope, and to
reduce litigation and insurance-market inefficiencies.  Effective products lia-
bility reform can be conducted within the courts by modifying parts of the
law that generate some of its most costly features.  The specific areas of
reform I detail below are: (1) the feasible safe alternative requirement,154 (2)
legal doctrine governing ambiguous risk-utility tradeoffs,155 (3) insurance
market inefficiencies,156 (4) preemption,157 (5) bright line rules versus
152 Toying With Deregulation, supra note 151. R
153 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 1, at 1439 n.2. R
154 See generally 63A Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 999 (2011) (“The essential inquiry is
whether the design chosen was a reasonable one from among the feasible choices of which
the defendant was aware or should have been aware.”).
155 For an overview of the risk-utility test and how courts have applied it, see generally
Twerski & Henderson, supra note 126. R
156 See Priest, supra note 105, at 1550–63 (detailing the problems created by third-party R
liability insurance).
157 See Alan Schwartz, Statutory Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory Com-
pliance Defense, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (arguing that compliance with federal
regulatory standards should excuse firms from liability).
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vague standards,158 and (6) controlling incentives for fraud in mass torts.159
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the areas in which products liability
law can be reformed, but it covers perhaps the most important areas.
A. The Feasible, Safer Alternative Requirement
One simple reform is to require that the plaintiff present evidence of a
feasible alternative design, as the Restatement (Third) recommends, and to
generally incorporate an analysis of alternatives as a necessary component of
the risk-utility test.160  Requiring proof of the existence of a feasible alterna-
tive would reduce uncertainty surrounding the risk-utility test and enable
courts to apply the test in a more consistent manner.  In the absence of a
feasible alternative design, it is a matter of guesswork and opinion whether
the challenged product design is unreasonably dangerous.  The feasible, rela-
tively safe alternative provides the comparison point for an evaluation of the
risk and utility tradeoff in any design.  Without an objective comparison
point, the only way to find that a specific design is unreasonably dangerous is
to compare it to some theoretical ideal, which may be unattainable, or if
attainable, may not be better in terms of its net contribution to consumer
welfare than the challenged design.  This would appear to be a common-
sense proposal, but some courts have rejected it.161
The feasible alternative requirement has been understood to require the
plaintiff to propose a feasible alternative of the same type as the challenged
product.  In other words, the requirement is not satisfied if the plaintiff pro-
158 As between the consumer expectations test and the risk-utility test, the consumer
expectations test has the advantage of at least a superficial simplicity.  If a court holds that a
producer’s product meets consumer expectations, then its decision settles the question of
liability for the particular challenged product and for similar products.  The risk-utility test,
however, involves a balancing inquiry that, arguably, invites future litigation.  The Restate-
ment (Third) of Torts: Products Liability favored the risk-utility test over the consumer
expectations test. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) cmt. d
(1998) (“Subsection (b) adopts a reasonableness (‘risk-utility balancing’) test as the stan-
dard for judging the defectiveness of product designs.”), with id. § 2(b) cmt. g
(“[C]onsumer expectations do not play a determinative role in determining defective-
ness.”).  However, for various reasons, courts and academics continue to advocate the con-
sumer expectations test. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1705 (2003) (the use of both consumer expectations and risk-utility
tests would “effectuate important lay risk values that seem unlikely to register in the more
narrowly delineated risk-utility test”).
159 Hylton, supra note 118, at 575 (proposing ways to deal with fraudulent claims in R
mass tort litigation).
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
161 Potter v. Chi. Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997) (“Contrary to
the rule promulgated in the . . . [Restatement (Third)], our independent review of the pre-
vailing common law reveals that the majority of jurisdictions do not impose upon plaintiffs
an absolute requirement to prove a feasible alternative design.” (emphasis added)); Kallio
v. Ford Motor Co. 407 N.W.2d 92, 96–97 (Minn. 1987) (same).
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poses a bicycle as a feasible alternative to a car design.162  In some cases,
however, it may be impossible for the plaintiff to find a feasible alternative
product—e.g., where the product is the first of its kind.  However, if we
broaden the feasible-alternatives inquiry it becomes clear that some feasible
alternative always exists.  Simply ask what the basic function of the challenged
product is, and find another product that can accomplish the same function.
Under this approach, a bicycle might be proposed as an alternative to a cer-
tain model of car.  But once the set of benchmarks is broadened it becomes
clear that alternatives can shed important light on risk-utility analysis.  Sup-
pose, for example, a bicycle is the likely feasible alternative to a specific car
design.  Removing the challenged car design from the product would leave
its users with the option of using bicycles, which might increase injury risk.
Similarly, finding an airplane design defective when there is no obvious feasi-
ble alternative design among airplanes leaves consumers with the option of
driving, which exposes the consumer to a greater injury risk than flying.
Linegar v. Armour of America, Inc.163 provides an illustration of the value
of analyzing realistic alternatives.  The alternative to the bullet-proof vest
challenged would have been a vest that covered the torso as well as the
arms—leaving almost no open areas where a bullet could reach vital organs.
The court noted that most police officers would refuse to use such a vest
because of its restrictions on mobility, and police departments might be una-
ble to afford it because of its expense.  Thus, risk-utility analysis involves not
only an analysis of the properties of the safer alternative, but its likely recep-
tion in the market, and use by consumers.
The problem of requiring a feasible alternative is entirely analogous to
that of requiring specificity in a negligence action.  Negligence law has long
required plaintiffs to bring forth a specific untaken precaution as evidence of
negligence.164  Many courts have repeated the famous comment: “negligence
in the air, so to speak, will not do.”165  The purpose for requiring a specific
untaken precaution is to permit courts to determine negligence on the basis
of feasible alternatives, and within a realistic causation framework.  In the
absence of the specificity requirement, negligence lawsuits would involve alle-
gations of negligence based only on the occurrence of the accident and its
foreseeability.166  Such a test would not permit courts to develop a consistent
policy with respect to the level of care that should be required and the
degree of foreseeability that implies negligence.  Policy consistency requires
courts to consider tradeoffs between feasible alternatives.
162 For a discussion on what can be considered a reasonable alternative design, see Rich-
ard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of “Alternative Design” Under the Restatement (Third)
of Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REV.
329 (1996).
163 909 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1990).
164 Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 143 (1989).
165 Palsgraf v. The Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (1928) (quoting FREDERICK
POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 455 (11th ed. 1920)).
166 Stone v. Bolton, [1950] K.B. 201 at 210 (C.A.).
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B. Risk-Risk Tradeoffs
A second area of products liability doctrine in need of reform consists of
cases in which there is no clear improvement in the level of risk imposed on
the consumer when the challenged design is compared to the allegedly safer
alternative.  I am not referring here to cases in which the balance between
risk and utility is unclear; cases such as this exist and courts are as well
equipped to handle them as they are for handling cases in which the negli-
gence question is unclear.  I refer instead to the cases in which the chal-
lenged design and the proffered alternative both impose a risk of injury on
the consumer, as in Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.167  The plaintiff, injured in an
accident in which the side of his car slammed against a steel pole and
crushed inward, asserted that the car was defectively designed because it did
not have a continuous steel box frame that would have kept the pole from
crushing the driver.  The defendant’s expert argued that the crumpling of
the car side was preferable in some instances to a box frame, because the
latter design would transmit the force of the impact to the driver and passen-
gers. Dawson involved a risk-risk tradeoff because both the challenged design
and the allegedly safer alternative imposed a substantial risk of injury on car
occupants in the event of an accident.  The appellate court, while recogniz-
ing the troubling implications of finding liability, upheld a jury verdict find-
ing Chrysler liable for a defective design.168
An obvious reform that would push products liability law closer to its
theoretical ideal is for courts to require high standards of proof in risk-risk
tradeoff cases such as Dawson.  As the court in Dawson recognized, a policy of
generally holding producers liable in the risk-risk tradeoff cases creates a
bind in which producers cannot escape liability.169  Given a choice between a
box frame and an x-frame, manufacturers would realize that either choice
would lead to liability precisely because it failed to offer the safety protections
that the alternative offered.  When products liability law effectively imposes
liability for all realistic design alternatives, it no longer offers the possibility of
guiding firms toward higher net-utility designs.  The law merely serves as a
mechanism to compensate plaintiffs.  While plaintiff compensation may be a
desirable goal, it is unclear why products liability law should be used for this
purpose given its high administrative costs.170  More importantly, when the
law fails to provide useful design incentives, it serves only as a broad blanket
of liability, reducing production levels as well as investment into the discovery
of safer alternatives.
167 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980).
168 Id. at 962.
169 Id. (noting that a risk-risk tradeoff case “permits individual juries applying varying
laws in different jurisdictions to set nationwide automobile safety standards and to impose
on automobile manufacturers conflicting requirements”).
170 Some courts reject the insurance theory as the sole basis for awarding damages. See,
e.g., Cafazzo v. Central Med. Health Serv., Inc., 635 A.2d 151, 154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(stating that the result would be a “search for a deep pocket”), aff’d, 668 A.2d 521 (Pa.
1995).
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Risk-risk tradeoff cases involve separable questions of breach and causa-
tion, as in ordinary negligence cases.  Breach is determined by whether the
design is unreasonable under the risk-utility standard.  Causation is deter-
mined by asking whether the particular injury would have occurred even if
the alternative design had been adopted.
Determining the unreasonableness of a design in the risk-utility analysis
is a forward-looking inquiry, as is the question of breach in a negligence case.
For the producer’s design to be found unreasonable, it must fail the risk-
utility comparison in the average, or general run, of accident settings that are
likely to involve the product.  In Dawson, this would require abstracting away
from the particular accident that occurred and examining the Chrysler Mon-
aco’s x-frame design under alternative accident scenarios.  The x-frame
design could be found unreasonable under the risk-utility test only if the box-
frame resulted in a lower injury risk, in most realistic accident settings, with-
out degrading the utility of the vehicle.
The causation inquiry examines whether the particular injury that
occurred, or a roughly similar injury, would have occurred even if the pro-
ducer had used the alternative design proposed by the plaintiff.  In other
words, if Chrysler had adopted the box frame for the Dodge Monaco, would
the plaintiff in Dawson have experienced a similar injury?
In order to prevent risk-risk tradeoff from punishing firms for the mere
act of selling a product, courts should demand reliable proof on both the
questions of design-reasonableness under the risk-utility test and the causa-
tion component.  In order to minimize the risk of erroneous findings of lia-
bility, courts could impose a “clear and convincing” standard of proof for
these questions in risk-risk tradeoff cases.
C. Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
On first impression, moral hazard should be a relatively minor concern
in products liability law.  Most of the cases involve personal injury, and rela-
tively few people would risk personal injury because they think they will be
compensated as the result of a products liability lawsuit.  But there are rea-
sons to suspect that moral hazard leads to significant losses in consumer wel-
fare given the current state of products liability doctrine.
Even assuming people are unlikely to take risks with their own lives or
health just because the law offers them compensation, they may take risks
with property or with other people’s lives.  The most likely area for moral
hazard to influence behavior is in the workplace, where employers know that
employees are more likely to try to sue the manufacturer of a machine that
injures them than their own employer, who is shielded from significant dam-
ages by workers’ compensation.171  The combination of arbitrary caps on
compensation under workers compensation coupled with the prospect of
171 See supra note 82 and accompanying text; Karen M. Moran, Note, Indemnity Under R
Workers’ Compensation: Recognizing a Special Legal Relationship Between Manufacturer and
Employer, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1095, 1098–99 (1987).
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generous damage awards under products liability generates disincentives for
workplaces to make investments in safety training and in supplemental safety
equipment.
And even with personal conduct and risk, moral hazard can generate
significant losses to consumer welfare.  Assume, as is common intuition, that
consumers are unlikely to take risks with their own lives merely because they
will be compensated through a products liability lawsuit.  Still, the producer
may be required to pay compensation, as well as legal fees, when its product
causes an injury to the consumer.  Given this, the producer will have to set
the price of his product to take into account the behavior of high-accident-
risk consumers.  If the producer increases the product’s price to cover com-
pensation to high-accident-risk consumers, the price increase may alter the
mix of consumer types purchasing the product.  As the product exposes the
consumer to greater injury risk, the price will have to rise accordingly, lead-
ing less intensive-use (and probably lower risk) consumers to forgo the prod-
uct, and to an even greater liability premium attached to the product as the
mix of product purchasers shifts toward more intensive-use consumers.
The law could dampen the welfare losses from moral hazard and adverse
selection by refusing compensation when the injured consumer has been
negligent. But this is not a complete answer to the moral hazard problem.
Even when the consumer has not been negligent, there may be safety steps or
investments that would be desirable, though failure to adopt the steps might
not be regarded as negligent.
Although adverse selection and moral hazard could be dampened by
refusing compensation to negligent or obviously careless consumers, prod-
ucts liability law has been more generous.  Some courts have held producers
liable for the foreseeable misuse of products by consumers.172  Jurisdictions
with comparative fault have incorporated products liability into the compara-
tive fault system, so that even some grossly careless consumers are still guar-
anteed compensation.
Daly v. General Motors Corp.173 established the principle of comparative
negligence in products liability lawsuits in California.  The plaintiff, Kirk
Daly, was thrown out of his car and sustained fatal injuries when he ran his
Buick Opel into the metal lane divider of an expressway.  The car was alleged
to be defectively designed because of its exposed push button door lock,
172 See, e.g., Steinmetz v. Bradbury Co., 618 F.2d 21, 23 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding
“rigidizer” machine manufacturer could not escape products liability on the basis of prod-
uct misuse, because such misuse was foreseeable); Lutz v. Nat’l Crane Corp., 884 P.2d 455,
460 (Mont. 1994) (precluding “unreasonable misuse” defense as a matter of law in action
against crane manufacturer, because such misuse was foreseeable); Soler v. Castmaster,
Div. of H.P.M. Corp., 484 A.2d 1225, 1232 (N.J. 1984) (“[I]n the event of either a substan-
tial alteration or misuse, the manufacturer will be responsible for resultant injuries to an
operator if the alteration or misuse implicated in the actual use of the machine was fore-
seeable and could have been prevented or reduced by the manufacturer.”); Germann v.
F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922, 925 (Minn. 1986) (finding liability for foreseeable
misuse).
173 575 P.2d 1162 (Cal. 1978).
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which according to the plaintiff caused the car door to open when it was
depressed in the collision.  The defendants introduced evidence that the
injury could have been avoided if Daly had locked his car door, or had worn
a seat belt, and that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident.  After a
jury verdict for the defendants, the California Supreme Court held that the
jury should apply comparative negligence principles and provide a judgment
to the plaintiff that reflects the relative weight of the defendant’s
negligence.174
Like comparative negligence for product-caused injuries, the foresee-
able misuse doctrine has a basis in negligence law.  Courts have long been
reluctant to hold victims liable for slight or foreseeable instances of contribu-
tory negligence.175  The foreseeable misuse doctrine can be analogized to
the relatively forgiving approach toward accident victims that courts have tra-
ditionally followed in ordinary negligence cases.  This forgiving approach has
been associated with the contributory negligence regime, in which victims
lose any claim to damages if they are negligent.
But the cost of a forgiving stance in contributory negligence law, in the
general negligence context, is relatively low and probably supports incentives
to take care.  Allowing a slightly negligent victim to receive damages against
one injurer generally does not impose costs on all other potential injurers or
on other potential victims.  In addition, slight instances of victim negligence
are foreseeable and one could say that primary negligence, on the part of the
injurer, is often negligent precisely because it fails to accommodate the fore-
seeable lapses of the potential victim.176
Products liability is distinguishable from the general negligence setting
(for example, traffic accidents) because a forgiving stance toward careless
consumers leads to higher prices for careful consumers.  The liability
surcharge works to some degree as a redistributive transfer from the rela-
tively careful to the relatively careless.  The transfer component shrinks mar-
kets and may even weaken incentives for care on the part of some consumers
(for example, weakening the incentives of employers to invest in safety).
The foreseeable misuse doctrine in products liability appears to be more
generous than a policy limited to forgiving foreseeable consumer lapses.
Since foreseeable misuse could be extended to misuses that producers would
not foresee, the doctrine forces producers to include a liability premium that
covers product uses that most careful consumers would not consider advisa-
ble.  The liability premium associated with product misuses shrinks the mar-
ket and taxes careful consumers to pay for the consequences of the conduct
of careless consumers.177
Given the costs of foreseeable misuse, comparative negligence, and
other doctrines that effectively tax relatively careful consumers to pay for the
174 Id. at 1172.
175 Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpre-
tation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1744–47, 1752, 1760–63 (1981).
176 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 274 (1971). [ILL]
177 Epstein, supra note 107, at 648, 660. R
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injuries of careless consumers, courts should approach these doctrines with
an eye toward restraining their scope within narrow and predictable bounds.
Extreme cases of carelessness on the part of the consumer, as in Daly, should
not be funneled through the liability system as a tax on ordinary consumers.
Courts should distinguish between cases involving consumer lapses, or failure
to take every step to avoid injury, and cases involving gross negligence or
indifference to the intended uses of the product.
D. Preemption
Closely related to the problem of risk-risk tradeoffs is the matter of pre-
emption.  Many of the product designs that are challenged in state-court
products liability lawsuits have been approved by federal regulatory agencies,
such as the Food and Drug Administration or the Consumer Product Safety
Commission.  Defendants in products liability lawsuits have defended them-
selves by relying on the argument that federal regulation preempts state reg-
ulation through the products liability laws.
The preemption doctrine serves a useful purpose.  If experts in the Food
and Drug Administration have approved the design of a medical device, after
hundreds of hours of rigorous examination, why should juries be allowed to
second guess that approval decision in a products liability lawsuit?  The juries
are less likely to make empirically defensible tradeoffs between risk and util-
ity than are the experts consulted by the agency.  From this perspective, pre-
emption doctrine can enhance consumer welfare by ensuring that
scientifically accurate assessments of risk-utility tradeoffs, made in connection
with technologically complicated products, can be respected by courts and
serve as a defense to products liability lawsuits that challenge those assess-
ments.  To be sure, regulatory agencies are not always perfect, as the lead
regulation example previously discussed suggests, but when agency experts
conduct a careful assessment of the risk-utility tradeoff associated with a
product, it is unlikely that an ordinary jury will be able to make a more accu-
rate assessment of the same tradeoff.
However, a funny thing has happened to preemption doctrine over the
course of its life.  It has morphed from a legal device that prevented juries
from second guessing the work of agency experts to a battleground over the
scope of federal power relative to state power.178  Preemption questions inev-
itably end up in the Supreme Court, with justices voting according to their
interpretations of the Supremacy Clause and its implications for the power of
federal regulatory agencies to preclude states from regulating matters within
agencies’ remit.  As long as this state of affairs continues, preemption doc-
trine is unlikely to settle into predictable rules.179
There is an alternative way to examine the preemption question.
Instead of viewing preemption exclusively through the Supremacy Clause,
178 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, An Economic Perspective on Preemption, 53 B.C. L. REV. 203,
223–27 (2012).
179 Id.
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state courts could, in the alternative, develop doctrines of abstention or regu-
latory compliance as a defense.180  That is, instead of looking at preemption
as a question of the federal government’s power to constrain states, courts
can look at it as a question of the state’s own power to constrain itself.  Com-
mon law doctrines that recognize regulatory compliance as a defense, under
appropriate conditions, could provide a predictable, stable source of rules
governing the relationship between state and federal regulation in a products
liability lawsuit.  Such rules would limit the uncertainty and instability inher-
ent in preemption defenses.
E. Bright Lines and Balancing
Given the dominance of the risk-utility test, one might ask whether there
is any value to courts in retaining the consumer expectations test in products
liability law.  The question is really one of the choice between bright lines
and balancing tests, or rules versus standards.  The consumer expectations
test is a bright line test, and the risk-utility test involves fact-based balancing.
In a purely functional sense, there is little reason for courts to retain the
consumer expectations test.  Most of the cases can be reconciled with the
risk-utility test, even the cases that claim to be based on the consumer expec-
tations test.  Why not make things simpler by jettisoning the consumer expec-
tations test?
A better case can be made for retaining the consumer expectations test,
largely for its value in clarifying the scope of liability for producers.  With a
clearer picture of the scope of liability, producers will be able to make more
accurate predictions of their payouts for products liability lawsuits.  This will
lead to a reduction in the products liability premium, to the benefit of
consumers.
The consumer expectations test is easily applied in cases involving risk
features that are obvious and central to the function of the product, such as
absence of a hard roof for convertible cars.181  These are cases that will pass
the risk-utility test as well, because the obvious risk-imposing feature is also
something that is central to function.  Typical examples are the exposed pro-
peller blades of airplanes, or of boats.182  The danger is open and obvious,
and also necessary for the product to function as intended.  Given the func-
tional value of the risk-imposing feature, courts applying the risk-utility test
would hold that the product is not unreasonably defective.183
For this class of products, the consumer expectations test provides a
bright line rule that informs potential victims and potential injurers of the
likely outcome of a products liability lawsuit.  This is valuable to producers
because it provides a level of predictability with respect to the trial outcome
that is not provided by the risk-utility test.  Of course, once a precedent has
180 Id. at 229–30.
181 Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
182 Fitzpatrick v. Madonna, 623 A.2d 322, 325–26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
183 See Linegar v. Armour of Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 1150, 1154–55 (8th Cir. 1990).
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been established under the risk-utility test, that precedent offers predictabil-
ity to potential defendants.  But every risk-utility examination is fact-depen-
dent, and therefore possibly unique to the case, unless you are looking at two
cases involving precisely the same fact pattern.  The consumer expectations
test provides a rule of law that permits lawyers to advise clients, and courts to
resolve cases on the basis of the absence of duty to the consumer.184
As a positive theory, the predictability value of the consumer expecta-
tions test probably explains why it remains in use even as courts have progres-
sively embraced the risk-utility test.  For example, in Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger
& Co.185 the Maryland Court of Appeals was urged by the plaintiff to adopt
the risk-utility standard with respect to handgun child-safety features.  The
court refused and upheld a jury verdict for the defendant on the ground that
the plaintiff’s handgun had performed as expected when the plaintiff’s three-
year old child got hold of it and fatally shot himself.  The court might have
been able to reach the same conclusion using the risk-utility test, though with
difficulty given the facts.  The feature of the consumer expectations test that
presumably made it attractive to the court in Halliday is that it abstracts away
from a fact-dependent risk-utility analysis and permits a court to issue a broad
liability shield with respect to a specific design.186
F. Controlling Incentives for Fraud in Mass Torts
My final reform proposal is specific to products liability class actions.
The asbestos and silicosis cases have revealed that plaintiffs’ attorneys have
incentives to bundle fraudulent victims within large classes.187  Some recent
investigations into the asbestos and silicosis plaintiff classes have discovered
large numbers of victims within plaintiff classes that had been diagnosed with
diseases related to asbestos or with silicosis even though a closer inspection
revealed that these diagnoses were unlikely to be valid.188
The incentive for fraud in mass torts is a byproduct of settlement strat-
egy.  For a class action, lawyers are aware that having a large class puts settle-
ment pressure on defendants.  Even if the defendant thinks that the chance
that he will be held liable is only one percent, the risk of high damages from
trial becomes significant as the plaintiff class size grows.
Suppose the defendant is innocent under a correct application of the
risk-utility test.  If each plaintiff suffers a loss of one hundred dollars and the
184 For a discussion of the predictability-value of duty rules, see Keith N. Hylton, Duty in
Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1501, 1525–26 (2007).
185 792 A.2d 1145, 1149 (Md. 2002).
186 I do not want to be understood as offering a defense for the decision in Halliday.
My point is that, as a positive matter, courts will tend toward the consumer expectations
test in order to provide clear statements on the scope of liability.
187 See, e.g., Helen E. Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 37 SW. U. L.
REV. 511, 522 (2008) (discussing Judge Janis Jack’s discovery of a fraudulent class of silico-
sis plaintiffs).
188 See Lester Brickman, Disparities Between Asbestosis and Silicosis Claims Generated by Liti-
gation Screenings and Clinical Studies, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 513, 514 (2007).
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risk of an erroneous finding of liability is only one percent, then the
expected damage payment for a defendant is only one dollar.  Suppose, how-
ever, that the lawyer comes to court with a class of ten million victims, each
with a loss of one hundred dollars.  Assuming the likelihood of an erroneous
finding of liability is still one percent, the expected damage payout for the
defendant is ten million dollars.  Thus, even though the defendant expects
confidently to win at trial, the risk of an erroneous finding in favor of the
plaintiff will put settlement pressure onto the defendant.
In addition to knowing that large classes increase settlement pressure,
lawyers also know that the defendant is unlikely to examine every single
plaintiff within the class; that would be too costly.  Given this, plaintiffs’ law-
yers, as the silicosis and asbestos cases suggest, have realized that there is a
positive payoff in including fraudulent plaintiffs within the class.
Although the problem of fraudulent plaintiffs appears to have been dis-
covered only in the asbestos and silicosis cases,189 the incentives that have
generated it in those cases are general.  Courts should develop strong punish-
ments that eliminate the prospect of gain on the part of attorneys if they
adopt a strategy of stuffing the plaintiff class with fraudulent victims.
Since the incentive to bundle fraudulent victims is driven by money, the
best remedy is a monetary sanction against plaintiffs’ lawyers who adopt this
tactic.  Suppose the lawyer represents a fraudulent class of 5000 victims, each
one claiming $10,000.  Suppose the likelihood of the fraud being discovered
is ten percent, and the lawyer expects to earn ten million dollars from the
class action.  In order to deter fraud on this order, the penalty would have to
be set at ninety million dollars.
This example is admittedly extreme in its assumption that an entire class
is fraudulent.  But the same principles apply to the bundling of fraudulent
claims within a class that is largely legitimate.  The court should determine
the amount the lawyer expected to earn from the fraud, and divide that
amount by the probability that the lawyer’s fraud would be discovered.  As
long as the fine is at least as large as the resulting number, the sanction
should provide an adequate deterrent to the bundling of fraudulent claims.
V. CONCLUSION
This has been a cautious defense of products liability law.  In contrast to
the skepticism expressed in prominent economic treatments of the topic, I
have argued that products liability law probably enhances social welfare.  The
core doctrines that have evolved appear to be optimal in light of the
problems of uncertainty in the application of legal tests in this area.  There
189 See id. at 517–18 (quoting Administrative Order No. 12, MDL 875, (May 31, 2007)
(Judge James Giles’s questioning of the sufficiency of asbestosis screenings as “lack[ing]
reliability and accountability”)); Brickman, supra note 119, at 1227–29 (arguing that “spe- R
cious, if not fraudulent” claims generated by litigation screenings in other types of mass
torts have faced little scrutiny, and that Judge Jack’s rebuke of silicosis screenings was an
anomaly).
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appears to be no case for wholesale revision or reversal of course.  Courts
should focus on the specific pockets of doctrine, such as preemption, that
generate uncertainty and instability in the law.
